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Abstract 
  
Target2 is the Eurozone’s cross-border payment system and is mandatory for the settlement 
of euro transactions involving Eurozone central banks.  It is being used to save the Eurozone 
from imploding. A key underlying problem is that the Eurozone does not satisfy the 
economic conditions for being an Optimal Currency Area, a geographical area over which a 
single currency and monetary policy can operate on a sustainable long-term basis. The 
different business cycles in the Eurozone, combined with poor labour and capital market 
flexibility, mean that systematic trade surpluses and deficits will build up – because inter-
regional exchange rates can no longer be changed. Surplus regions need to recycle the 
surpluses back to deficit regions via transfers to keep the Eurozone economies in balance. But 
the largest surplus country – Germany – refuses formally to accept that the European Union 
is a ‘transfer union’. However, deficit countries including the largest of these – Italy – is 
using Target2 for this purpose. Further, the size of the deficits being built up is causing 
citizens in deficit countries to lose confidence in their banking systems and they are 
transferring funds to banks in surplus countries. Target2 is also being used to facilitate this 
capital flight. However, these are not viable long-term solutions to systemic Eurozone trade 
imbalances and weakening national banking systems. There are only two realistic outcomes. 
The first is full fiscal and political union – which has long been the objective of Europe’s 
political establishment. The second is that the Eurozone breaks up. 
 
 
 
* I am grateful for very useful comments received from Tim Congdon, Kevin Dowd, Patrick 
Minford, Barnabas Reynolds and John Whittaker. I remain responsible for any errors and 
omissions. 
  
 
 
Table of contents  
Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 1 
What is an Optimal Currency Area? .......................................................................................... 2 
Some historical examples of unsuccessful and successful OCAs ............................................. 3 
Looking at the Eurozone as a possible OCA ............................................................................. 4 
So how has the Eurozone fared since its introduction in 1999? .............................................. 13 
Is the Eurozone an OCA? ........................................................................................................ 23 
How does Target2 work? ......................................................................................................... 24 
How Target2 bails out the euro ................................................................................................ 30 
So Target2 saves the euro? ...................................................................................................... 31 
Problems with implementing quantitative easing in the Eurozone .......................................... 37 
Can a country leave the Eurozone? .......................................................................................... 41 
Is there a political solution to the Eurozone problem? ............................................................ 43 
Why is the problem with Target2 so little known? .................................................................. 49 
Implications for the UK ........................................................................................................... 53 
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................... 55 
Appendix A – The role of banknotes in Target2 ..................................................................... 59 
Appendix B - Capital subscription to the European Central Bank, 1 January 2015 ................ 62 
Appendix C – List of acronyms ............................................................................................... 63 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
Introduction 
The European Union (EU)1 began the process of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) by 
introducing the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) in 1979. Its purpose was to 
reduce exchange rate variability and achieve monetary stability in the EU, in preparation for 
the introduction of a single currency – the euro – which took place on 1 January 1999.  
 
To support its introduction, a Eurozone-wide payments system was needed. Target22 is a 
real-time gross settlement system that settles euro-denominated cross-border transactions 
within the Eurozone.3 It is operated by the central banks of France, Germany, and Italy. Its 
use is mandatory for the settlement of any euro transaction involving the Eurosystem, which 
comprises the European Central Bank (ECB) and the national central banks (NCBs) of the 
Eurozone member states. Target2’s objectives are to: 
• support the implementation of the Eurosystem's monetary policy and the functioning 
of the euro money market 
• minimise systemic risk in the payments market 
• increase the efficiency of cross-border payments in euros, and 
• maintain the integration and stability of the Eurozone money market.4 
We will show that Target2 is critical to the survival of the Eurozone as a currency union – a 
geographical area that uses the same single currency. We will also show that a currency union 
will only survive in the long term if it satisfies the conditions for being an Optimal Currency 
Area. Until (or unless) it does so, the more efficient economies in the Eurozone will build up 
systematic trade surpluses against the weaker economies – and residents in the weaker 
economies will move their capital to banks in the stronger economies whenever confidence in 
their banking systems collapses. 
 
There are four specific questions we seek to answer: 
 
• Is the Eurozone an Optimal Currency Area? 
• How long can the euro survive if it is not? 
• What role does Target2 play in prolonging the euro’s survival? 
• Can a political solution save the euro? 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Or the European Economic Community as it then was. 
2 Trans-European Automated Real-time Gross Settlement Express Transfer System. 
3 The Eurozone is the subset of EU states that use the euro: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, and Spain. 
4https://www.ecb.europa.eu/paym/t2s/about/html/index.en.html 
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What is an Optimal Currency Area? 
A single currency (or currency union) will only survive long term in a specific geographical 
area if that area satisfies the four conditions laid down by Nobel prize winning economist 
Robert Mundell in his Theory of the Optimal Currency Area (OCA).5 These are: (1) the 
different parts of the area are not subject to asymmetric macroeconomic and financial shocks, 
which, in practice, means that the different areas have similar business cycles, so that a single 
monetary policy in the form of a single interest rate will be effective across the whole area – 
with the interest rate raised in a boom to reduce inflation and reduced in a slump to prevent 
recession,6 (2) sufficient wage flexibility and labour mobility to eliminate unemployment 
quickly, (3) sufficient price flexibility and capital mobility to remove trade imbalances 
quickly, and (4) a counter-cyclical stabilisation mechanism, e.g., a system of officially agreed 
regional redistributions whereby regions with balance of payments surpluses redistribute 
them via fiscal transfers to regions with balance of payments deficits; the normal way in 
which regional trade imbalances are removed – changes in inter-regional exchange rates – is 
no longer possible when there is a single currency which effectively fixes these exchange 
rates permanently at the levels at which the countries joined the single currency. 
 
Collectively, these conditions test the degree of economic and monetary integration of the 
geographical area in question, through either the operation of market forces or the 
effectiveness of policy tools. An increase in trade between the members of the currency union 
– as measured by an increase in the ratio of traded to non-traded goods and services – would 
be a direct test of whether the currency union had increased the degree of economic 
integration and hence moved its members closer to being in an OCA.7  
 
It is possible that intra-EU trade could be harmed by exchange rate fluctuations and a 
currency union eliminates this volatility: ‘Removing “borders” broadly intended as 
impediments to trade, but also financial flows, as well as sharing a single currency, are a 
powerful magnet for deeper economic and financial integration. Such endogeneity [of the 
OCA criteria] could also result from deeper financial integration and risk-sharing, increased 
symmetry of shocks and similarly output synchronisation, and an increased pace of product 
and labour market reforms to enhance flexibility’.8  Supporters of a single European currency 
argue that by disregarding the endogenous effect of currency union,9 Mundell’s criteria were 
likely to bias downwards the expected net benefits from monetary integration.10 
                                                 
5 Robert A. Mundell (1960) The Monetary Dynamics of International Adjustment under Fixed and Flexible 
Exchange Rates, Quarterly Journal of Economics,74, 227-57. 
6 In a single economic area, there can only ever be one single currency and one single (risk-free) interest rate – 
and not multiple currencies with multiple (risk-free) interest rates – as was pointed out a long time ago by, for 
example, Tim Congdon (1992) The Logistical Requirements of a Single European Currency, Gerrard & 
National Monthly Economic Review, June.  
7 Ronald I. McKinnon (1963) Optimum Currency Areas, American Economic Review, 53, 717-725.  
8 Francesco Paolo Mongelli (2008) European Economic and Monetary Integration, and the Optimum Currency 
Area Theory, Economic Papers 302, Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, European 
Commission.  
9 For the benefit of non-economists, ‘endogenous’ means originating or developing from within a system. So the 
phrase ‘the endogenous effect of currency union’ means that the very existence of the currency union could 
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Some historical examples of unsuccessful and successful OCAs 
Keynes argued that the Sterling Area – which he defined as the system under which members 
of the British Commonwealth conduct their international banking through London – would 
not make a successful OCA: ‘[I]f the Sterling Area is turned into a Currency Union, the 
members in credit would have to make a forced and non-liquid loan of their favourable 
balances to the members in debit….It is improbable that South Africa or India would accept 
such arrangements’.11 
 
By contrast, the US is considered to be a successful OCA, although it took around 150 years 
from independence in 1776 for full currency and monetary union to be realised.12 The 
process of monetary union began with the introduction of the Constitution in 1789. The dollar 
was introduced in 1792. The 1863 National Bank Act established a national banking system, 
although at the time three currencies were in circulation: a greenback dollar issued by the 
Federal government, a Confederate dollar (backed by cotton) issued by the Confederacy, and 
a Pacific states dollar (backed by gold). With the defeat of the Confederacy in the Civil War 
1865, the southern states switched to the greenback. In 1879, a single currency emerged when 
the US moved to the Gold Standard at the pre-Civil War parity level. However, the Gold 
Standard turned out not to be flexible enough to provide liquidity during the frequent banking 
and stock market crises that occurred in the US during the remainder of the 19th Century and 
the beginning of the 20th. In 1913, the Federal Reserve Act was passed and this introduced a 
US central bank, the Federal Reserve or Fed. Initially, the Fed’s powers were limited to 
control of the banking system and issuing dollars.  
 
Over the years, the powers of the Fed have changed, especially following the stock market 
crash of 1929 which led to the worst banking crisis in US history. The Fed’s policy response 
was to tighten monetary conditions, rather than provide liquidity to the banking system.  As a 
result, one third of US banks became insolvent and this contributed to the Great Depression 
which lasted throughout the 1930s. The Fed now has responsibility for a monetary policy that 
takes into account the level of unemployment and the growth of real gross domestic product, 
as well as the rate of inflation.13 Nevertheless, a single (Federal Funds) interest rate operates 
across the whole US, regardless of regional unemployment differences. 
The Great Depression led the Roosevelt government to introduce a system of federally 
funded transfer programmes – such as social security and unemployment insurance – in the 
                                                                                                                                                        
encourage the OCA criteria to develop and ultimately be satisfied, even if they were not operating effectively 
prior to its introduction. 
10 M. Emerson, D. Gros, A. Italianer, J. Pisani-Ferry and H. Reichenbach (1992) One Market, One Money: An 
Evaluation of the Potential Benefits and Costs of Forming an Economic and Monetary Union, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford; J. Frankel and A. Rose (1998) The Endogenity of the Optimum Currency Area 
Criteria, Economic Journal, 108, 1009-1025. 
11 John Maynard Keynes (1942, Paras 28 and 29) Proposals for an International Currency (or Clearing) Union, 
11 February, reproduced in J. K. Horsefield (ed) (1969) Part I: Before Bretton Woods - The Keynes Plan, The 
International Monetary Fund 1945-1965: Twenty Years of International Monetary Co-ordination, Volume III: 
Documents, International Monetary Fund, Washington DC. 
12 HM Treasury (2003) The United States as a Monetary Union, HMSO, Norwich. 
13 As laid out in the Humphrey–Hawkins Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act 1978. 
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New Deal. Federal government fiscal policy as a stabilisation tool has continued in existence 
since then. One of its aims is to help the different regions of the US adjust to differential 
business cycles and macroeconomic shocks. When some parts of the US are experiencing a 
boom, others can be experiencing a recession; when there is a shock to the oil price, Texas 
will be affected more than other states. The revenues of the US federal government amount to 
21% per cent of GDP and 12% of federal government expenditure comprises transfers to state 
and local governments. States are able to set budgets without federal interference. They are 
restricted by their own constitutions from running current account deficits, although deficits 
are, in practice, tolerated during recessions. However, there are no restrictions on states’ 
abilities to finance capital expenditures on, say, roads and school by borrowing.14 
The Constitution also allowed free trade, travel, migration and capital flows between the 
states from the very beginning. Labour mobility in the US has always been fairly high since 
its foundation, beginning with the westward migration in the 19th Century in search of 
agricultural land. Further, labour mobility is an effective mechanism for adjusting to longer-
term structural changes and to regional shocks in the US.15 In addition, wages tend to fall in 
regions experiencing unemployment.16  Labour and indeed capital mobility are, of course, 
helped, by the US having: a common language; common or similar laws for contracts, 
property, insurance and insolvency; common or similar professional practices and standards; 
universities with common academic standards; and nation-wide federally run programmes of 
social security and elderly health care.  
It is therefore clear that the US, at least since the 1930s, satisfies three of the four conditions 
for an OCA and this is good enough to classify the US as an OCA. 
 
Looking at the Eurozone as a possible OCA 
 
The Eurozone is sufficiently geographically large and economically heterogeneous that the 
different regions are subject to different business cycles and to asymmetric macroeconomic 
and financial shocks – even more so than in the US.17 More precisely, in the case of the 
Eurozone, it is the peripheral members that appear to experience the most extreme outcomes.  
 
One study found that:  
 
                                                 
14 Currency Unions: Europe vs. the United States, James Tobin Policy Options, Institute for Research on Public 
Policy, 1 May 2001, http://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/one-world-one-money/currency-unions-europe-vs-
the-united-states/ 
15 O.J. Blanchard and L.F. Katz. (1992) Regional Evolutions, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1: 1-75. 
16 K. McMorrow (1996) The Wage Formation Process and Labour Market Flexibility in the Community, the US 
and Japan, European Commission Economic Paper No. 118. 
17 Tamim Bayoumi and Barry Eichengreen (1992) Shocking Aspects of European Monetary Unification,  
National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper # 3949.  This study finds that macroeconomic supply 
and demand shocks are ‘significantly more idiosyncratic across [EU] countries than across US regions…[EU] 
countries also exhibit a slower response to [these] shocks than US regions’. 
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Joining a single European currency dominated by and centred around a strong 
economic core (focused on Germany) may be beneficial to peripheral member regions 
in good economic times (such as the boom years of 2000-2007 when capital flowed 
from the core to the more peripheral parts of Euroland18), but it may prove highly 
disadvantageous once a major shock like the financial crisis of 2007-08 occurs, since 
the scope for independent monetary intervention no longer exists.  At the same time, 
the Eurozone lacks a centralised fiscal stabilisation mechanism by which to provide 
counter-cyclical intervention.19  Another study found that:  
Some of [the OCA] conditions were satisfied at the inception of the EMU, others were 
missing at the beginning, but improved over time as expected by the endogenous 
approach to the OCA theory. The common fiscal capacity was the main missing 
element of the initial construction of the Eurozone, and still is. The common budget is 
so exiguous that its effectiveness as a shock absorption mechanism is 
negligible….Some of the concerns raised on the eve of the euro did actually 
materialise, even if not immediately. First, in its first decade, the Eurozone did not 
experience major turbulences, because growing financial integration was 
compensating the need for fiscal transfers, channelling the excess of saving from the 
‘core’ to the ‘periphery’. Second, the mechanism generated record-high private 
indebtedness in the ‘periphery’ and exposure of the banks in the ‘core’, making the 
whole system more fragile as it relied upon financial market stability. Third, once the 
long-feared shock [i.e., the Global Financial Crisis (GFC)] hit, the mechanism proved 
weak and non-resilient. The inherent weaknesses of the EMU became evident. Fourth, 
as it had been foreseen, the cost of the adjustment after the shock fell mainly on 
labour, with much higher and longer unemployment in the Eurozone than both non-
Eurozone EU and the US. Fifth, as the [OCA] theory suggested, the lack of common 
mechanisms of adjustment dramatically increased the socio-economic divergences 
within the EMU.20 
 
The ECB’s sole formal monetary policy objective is price stability, which is much more 
restrictive than that of the Fed. And, like the Fed, the ECB is not able to apply a different 
monetary policy in different member states. 
Fiscal policy is also more restrictive in the European Union (EU) than in the US. The central 
revenues available to Brussels are limited to 1.7% of GDP. Eurozone rules – as formulated in 
the 1993 Maastricht Treaty and introduced as part of the 1997 Stability and Growth Pact 
                                                 
18 This capital flowed in the belief that it was safe against the peripheral countries leaving the euro. It dried up 
when the markets became concerned that some countries might leave or be forced to leave the euro. 
19 Bernard Fingleton, Harry Garretsen and Ron Martin (2015) Shocking Aspects of  Monetary Union: The 
Vulnerability of Regions in Euroland, Journal of Economic Geography, 15, 907-934. 
20 Paolo Pasimeni (2014) An Optimum Currency Crisis, European Journal of Comparative Economics, 11, 173-
204. 
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(SGP) – restrict member states from running budget deficits exceeding 3% of their GDP,21 or 
having national debts exceeding 60% of their GDP.22 These rules apply whether their breach 
is due to an economic recession beyond the control of the member state or due to government 
spending profligacy. Further, no distinction is made between current and capital expenditures. 
The underlying philosophy within the EU justifying these restrictive monetary and fiscal 
policies is that the required adjustments to any adverse economic fluctuation will operate 
principally through market forces. The hope is that prices and wages will adjust to counter 
shocks in production and employment. Similarly, labour and capital will move between 
regions and industries in response to wage and price signals. In the process, the rest of the EU 
would be pulled up to German levels of productivity, living standards will converge 
throughout the Eurozone and this will encourage EU members not in the Eurozone23 to adopt 
the euro. 
The EU does have a number of structural and investment funds whose purpose is ‘to invest in 
job creation and a sustainable and healthy European economy and environment’ as part of the 
SGP. There are five funds in total:24 
• European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) – ‘promotes balanced development in 
the different regions of the EU’. 
 
• European Social Fund (ESF) – ‘supports employment-related projects throughout 
Europe and invests in Europe’s human capital – its workers, its young people and all 
those seeking a job’. 
 
• Cohesion Fund (CF) – ‘funds transport and environment projects in countries where 
the gross national income (GNI) per inhabitant is less than 90% of the EU average. In 
2014-20, these are Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia and 
Slovenia’. 
 
• European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) – ‘focuses on resolving 
the particular challenges facing EU's rural areas’. 
 
• European Maritime and Fisheries Fund (EMFF) – ‘helps fishermen to adopt 
sustainable fishing practices and coastal communities to diversify their economies, 
improving quality of life along European coasts’. 
                                                 
21 They can be fined 0.5% of their GDP if they do so. 
22 These were also two of the ‘convergence criteria’ than member states had to satisfy before they could join the 
euro. 
23 Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Sweden, and the UK. 
24 https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/european-structural-and-investment-funds_en 
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All these funds deal with the long-term sustainability of different regions of the EU, as well 
as aiming to reduce long-term regional income inequalities. While they involve a 
redistribution of resources from richer to poorer regions, none of them is intended to address 
the shorter term economic problems that arise because of differential regional business cycles 
or asymmetric macroeconomic and financial economic shocks.25 
So the EU does not have the monetary or fiscal policy tools – either automatic or 
discretionary – nor the formal system of regional redistributions needed to deal with the 
possibility that some regions will be booming, while others will be in a slump. It is reliant on 
wage and price flexibility and on labour and capital mobility for this purpose. Its principal 
vehicle for delivering this flexibility and mobility is the Single Market. 
Yet despite the EU claiming to operate the Single Market26 with its ‘four freedoms’ – the 
freedom of movement of goods, services, workers and capital – there is no effective ‘single 
market’ in services, workers, or capital. EU workers are, of course, free to look for work in 
any member state and both unskilled and very highly skilled workers are able to find work if 
they are willing to accept the working conditions involved. However, a whole range of 
professional workers in between these two groups find it difficult to get jobs in their own 
profession, because there is frequently no mutual recognition of qualifications. There are, in 
addition, other barriers, such as language differences, the non-portability of pension rights 
etc. Labour mobility within the EU is estimated to be one-third the level found in the US,27 
and there are significant wage rigidities in European labour markets.28 Similarly, despite 
numerous attempts to create a Capital Markets Union, the European capital markets are far 
from integrated, and, further, it is arguable that financial regulations being introduced at EU 
level are impeding rather than promoting the process of integration, reflecting the widespread 
hostility to the Anglo-Saxon capital markets model on the continent. 
 
                                                 
25 In 2011, the Eurozone states introduced a Euro-Plus Pact to deal with the weaknesses of the SGP. Three of its 
key aims are to foster competitiveness, to foster employment and to contribute to the sustainability of public 
finances (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euro_Plus_Pact). 
26  The Single Market was introduced in 1993, following the Single European Act 1987.  It is the internal market 
of the EU’s Customs Union.  The Customs Union imposes the Common External Tariff on imports coming into 
the EU, while there are no tariffs on trade between member states. The purpose of the Single Market is to reduce 
and eliminate non-tariff barriers – such as differential regulations and restrictive practices – on trade between 
member states. 
27 Barry Eichengreen (1991) Is Europe an Optimum Currency Area?, NBER Working Paper No.3579; 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w3579. 
28 J. Dreze and C. Bean (1990) Europe’s Unemployment Problem: Introduction and Synthesis. In J. Dreze and 
C. Bean (eds) Europe’s Unemployment Problem, MIT Press, Cambridge MA; R Layard, S. Nickell and R. 
Jackman (1991) Unemployment: Macroeconomic Performance and the Labour Market, Oxford University 
Press, New York; P. B.  Kenen (1995) What Have We Learned from the EMS Crises?, Journal of Policy 
Modelling, 17 (5), 449–461; C.A.E Goodhart (1995) The Political Economy of Monetary Union. In P.B. Kenen 
(ed.) Understanding Independence: The Macroeconomics of the Open Economy, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton. 
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In 2010, in response to both the GFC and the consequential banking crisis in peripheral 
Eurozone states which began in October 2008, the EU set up the European System of 
Financial Supervision (ESFS).29 This comprises: 
 
• the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) – to oversee the EU financial system and 
mitigate systemic risk 
• the three European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) – to provide incentives to avoid 
excessive risk taking in the financial industry and to promote a level playing field in 
support of beneficial financial integration within the EU – namely: 
o the European Banking Authority (EBA) 
o the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) 
o the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) 
• the European Stability Mechanism (ESM)30 – organised by member states of the 
Eurozone to preserve financial stability in Europe by providing financial assistance to 
Eurozone states in financial difficulty. The ESM can borrow via bond issuance up to 
€500bn and €190bn of this was used to bail out the Irish and Portuguese banks in 
2010-11. In September 2012, the ECB introduced a programme of Outright Monetary 
Transactions (OMT) under which it makes purchases (‘outright transactions’) in the 
secondary market of bonds issued by Eurozone members, with the aim of 
‘safeguarding an appropriate monetary policy transmission and the singleness of the 
monetary policy’. The total cost of rescuing EU banks between October 2008 and 
December 2012 amounted to €592bn in state aid.31  
• the Securities Markets Programme (SMP) – to ensure depth and liquidity in 
malfunctioning segments of the bond markets (where transactions were having a 
significant effect on bond prices) and to restore an appropriate functioning of the 
monetary policy transmission mechanism.  To avoid the SMP altering the Eurozone’s 
declared monetary policy, the bond purchases conducted through the SMP are 
sterilised and do not change central bank liquidity.32 
 
Stanislas Yassukovich33 agrees that ‘there is effectively no “single market” in services in the 
EU, and certainly not in financial services. For example, a qualified German hairdresser must 
requalify to practice in France (and there are two different qualifications, domicile and shop), 
and an English solicitor cannot provide conveyance for a residential property sale in most EU 
countries. As there is … no unified capital market and no European stock exchange, the 
                                                 
29 https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/banking-and-finance/financial-supervision-and-risk-
management/european-system-financial-supervision_en 
30 Set up in 2012 to replace two emergency funding programmes, the European Financial Stability Facility and 
the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism, which both became operational in 2010. However, both these 
programmes continue in existence to deal with the bailouts in Ireland, Portugal and Greece. 
31 Hugo Dixon (2016) EU enters brave new world of bank bail-ins, Reuters, 4 January; 
http://blogs.reuters.com/hugo-dixon/2016/01/04/eu-enters-brave-new-world-of-bank-bail-ins/ 
32 ECB Monthly Bulletin, June 2010; 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/mb201006_focus01.en.pdf?2b5c64d483a41a019fd461f595a36b46 
33 The Euromarket pioneer who was Chairman of the Securities Association, Deputy Chairman of the Stock 
Exchange and Chairman of Merrill Lynch Europe, Middle East and Africa during and after the 1986 Big Bang. 
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regulation of financial services, focused largely on investor protection, is at national not EU 
level’.34  
 
Where there are financial regulations at EU level, these tend to be protectionist, excessive or 
ineffective. Here are some examples:  
 
• The EBA plans to implement Basle III in a consistent manner across the EU, despite 
Basle III being a voluntary code and estimates by the OECD that its implementation 
will impede global economic growth by between -0.05 and -0.15% p.a.35  
• Implementation of the Total Loss Absorbing Capacity (TLAC) rules. The European 
Commission has plans to increase EU oversight of foreign banks. Foreign banks with 
significant activities in Europe would be required to operate via ‘intermediate holding 
companies’. These would have to meet additional capital requirements, to meet an 
internationally agreed rule, known as TLAC, and other minimum internationally 
agreed standards to ensure that they could be wound down safely if they fail. The 
banks would have to issue equity and junior debt (such as contingent convertible 
(CoCo) bonds), that would be written off in the event of a crisis. Philip Hammond, the 
UK finance minister, has described the proposals as anti-competitive and could also 
‘constrain prudential authorities in a way that could have an impact on financial 
stability’.36 
• Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) II – dealing with the trading of 
and the provision of services by investment intermediaries relating to financial 
instruments (e.g., shares, bonds, units in collective investment schemes and 
derivatives). Jeff Sprecher, CEO of Intercontinental Exchange, has described MiFID 
II – which came into effect in January 2018 – as ‘a terrible piece of legislation that 
imposes tremendous costs on the industry’. MiFID II grew out of the G20 financial 
regulation principles established in 2009 to reduce systemic risk following the GFC, 
but has been criticised as being excessively complex and its implementation was 
delayed by a year. One particular issue is the unbundling of investment research and 
transaction costs.37 MiFID II, in order to achieve full cost transparency for end 
customers, will end the standard industry practice of brokerage firms providing 
investment research free of charge in return for execution business. McKinsey has 
estimated that the profits of European asset managers that pay for research in full 
could be reduced by 15-20%. Larry Fink, CEO of BlackRock, expressed concern that 
MiFID II could lead to a dearth of research coverage focused on smaller listed 
                                                 
34 Stanislas Yassukovich (2017) The City has nothing to fear from Brexit, Financial Times, 12 January. 
35 Slovik, P. and Cournede, B. (2011), Macroeconomic impact of Basle III, OECD Economics Working Papers; 
DOI: 10.1787/18151973. 
36 Jim Brunsden (2016) Hammond clashes with Brussels over new bank oversight rules, Financial Times, 7 
December. 
37 European equity research and advisory service costs are estimated at $1.35bn, compared with $2.9bn in cash 
equity commissions in the year June 2016 – June 2017 (Samuel Agini (2017) Mifid II will spark $1.3bn-a-year 
research battle, Financial News, 23 August). 
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companies.38 Crispin Odey, of Odey Asset Management, believes that MiFID II will 
lead to fewer trades, reduced price discovery and less efficient markets.39 Another 
issue is the reporting of trades to regulators within a specified time – the cost of which 
has encouraged some hedge funds, such as Brevan Howard and Tudor, to register 
under the Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive rather than under MiFID 
II.40 The total cost to the finance industry of implementing MiFID II has been 
estimated at more than €2.5bn.41 Within months of its introduction, trading in a 
number of futures and options contracts was being shifted from London to the US and 
European investment banks were losing business to their US rivals.42 
• The Capital Requirements Directive IV is damaging for EU financial markets in terms 
of restrictions on cross-border lending and a bankers bonus cap.  
• Solvency II. The Treasury select committee announced an inquiry into the 
‘manifest shortcomings’ of the Solvency II directive dealing with insurance 
companies.43 The inquiry’s report was published in October 2017. While the 
evidence submitted to the committee highlighted problems with the legislation 
as drafted (e.g., in respect of the risk of procyclicality and market distortion, the 
calibration of the Risk Margin, the approval of Internal Models and subsequent 
model change, and the volume and complexity of data required from firms), the 
report was concerned with the way Solvency II has been implemented in the 
UK by the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA): ‘An excessively strict 
interpretation of the requirements of Solvency II, and of its own obligations, has 
limited the PRA’s thinking in a way which could be detrimental to UK plc’.44 
Further, Brexit is being used by EU financial regulators as an opportunity to make a power 
grab. We consider some examples. 
 
The first relates to ‘delegation’. In July 2017, ESMA issued guidance to EU national 
regulators on how to deal with fund manager relocations from the UK after Brexit. It said that 
national regulators dealing with ‘authorisation’ requests should satisfy themselves that firms 
do not ‘perform substantially more portfolio management and/or risk management functions 
for the relevant funds in their original member states or third country on a delegation basis’. 
Under the 1985 Ucits Directive, fund managers are allowed to delegate certain functions for 
                                                 
38 David Ricketts (2017) BlackRock’s Fink voices concern over Mifid II, Financial News, 12 October. 
39 Tom Eckett (2017) Odey warns of 'terrifying' MiFID II and tapering combination, Investment Week, 2 
October. 
40 Lucy McNulty (2017) Will others follow Brevan and Tudor’s regulatory route?, Financial News, 21 August. 
41 Attracta Mooney (2017) €2.5bn cost of Mifid II rattles asset managers, FTfm, 27 January; Carlo Svaluto 
Moreolo (2017) Briefing: MiFID II – The birth of a market, IPE Magazine, July/August. 
42 David Wighton (2018) City on the defensive as regulation tilts playing field for Wall Street, Financial News, 
30 April; Paul Clarke (2018) Morgan Stanley says EU banks are losing ground as MiFID II bites, Financial 
News, 30 April. 
43 Philip Georgiadis (2016) MPs to review Solvency II, Financial News, 13 September. 
44  House of Commons Treasury Committee (2017) The Solvency II Directive and its impact on the UK 
Insurance Industry, HC 324, 27 October; 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmtreasy/324/324.pdf 
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their EU funds – such as portfolio management and risk management – to organisations 
outside the EU. Peter Astleford from law firm Dechert said: ‘US managers, in particular, will 
have a wary eye on this new manifestation of “Fortress Europe”. The implied and overt 
requirements for local substance, taken literally, show a new and potentially worrying sign 
for … managers’. Dan Waters, managing director of ICI Global – the trade body representing 
fund managers globally – said ‘any restrictions on delegation could impact fund managers 
globally… The language about delegation of portfolio management – and to third countries – 
is of huge concern.  Ucits would not exist in South America or Asia if portfolio management 
could not be delegated. Where is the evidence it is not working?’.45 The then City minister, 
Stephen Barclay, said the government ‘strongly supports the global delegation model for 
portfolio management, in partnership with other countries that share our views on this issue. 
[It allowed UK asset managers] to sit at the heart of global investment allocation [and also 
benefited Europe]. A restricted delegation model would cause fragmentation and prompt 
funds located in Europe [to] leave the continent for other financial centres, such as New York 
or Hong Kong’.46 
 
The second relates to EU attempts to influence organisations that are currently located in 
London. The European Commission has proposed granting ESMA regulatory powers over 
both central counterparties or CCPs (i.e., clearing houses) and credit rating agencies based 
outside of the EU, which would include London-based organisations after March 2019.47 In 
the case of euro-clearing, it wants this activity re-located to the EU. Daniel Maguire, CEO of 
the London Clearing House (LCH), told a Treasury select committee meeting that he did not 
believe that forced relocation of the LCH to the EU ‘is a desirable element of the 
Commission's proposal’. However, he did concede that in a ‘hard’ Brexit scenario without a 
transition period, the LCH could be forced to relocate some, if not all, of its business. But 
Frankfurt might not necessarily be the victor in that scenario: ‘The answer may be relocation 
going the other way, to the States’.48 
 
The third is another example relating to EU rules on ‘authorisation’. It has been suggested 
that trillions of pounds worth of derivatives contracts between UK and EU counterparties 
could suddenly become illegal if there is ‘no deal’ (on authorisation) in March 2019. 
However, this has been dismissed as failing to recognise the operation of public international 
law, the European Convention on Human Rights and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
A report by law firm Shearman & Sterling concludes that by combining human rights law 
and taking maximum advantage of reverse solicitation regimes, there should be no material 
‘cliff edge’ for the performance of existing financial contracts or the servicing of existing 
customers resulting from Brexit. Reverse solicitation allows wholesale market customers to 
opt out of EU financial regulation entirely when buying services from outside the EU. 
                                                 
45 David Ricketts (2017) US fund managers jittery over post-Brexit delegation, Financial News, 21 August. 
46 Susanna Rust (2017) UK sets up asset management taskforce in Brexit-fuelled action plan, IPE, 2 October. 
47 Lucy McNulty (2017) Rating agencies plan Brexit moves as watchdog ups demands, Financial News, 9 
October; Nick Reeve (2017) ESMA: Hard Brexit would pose 'significant stability risks', IPE, 10 October. The 
issue of CCPs is discussed later in the report. 
48 Samuel Agini (2017) LSE’s clearing boss eyes New York amid Brexit row - The US, rather than Germany, 
could win the battle over clearing after Brexit, Financial News, 25 October. 
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Further, many pre-existing financial contracts will not be affected by local EU member state 
licensing requirements post-Brexit. The regulated activity will have taken place when the 
contract was entered into, and so any future performance after Brexit will not need a licence. 
In addition, many other financial contracts do not involve cross-border dealings in law: the 
performance of these contract will remain solely within the jurisdiction of UK regulators. For 
a relatively small subset of financial contracts that could involve local authorisation 
requirements in some EU member states, appeal can be made to property rights and 
international law protections. The right to property protects rights under contracts between 
UK and EU27 businesses that exist prior to Brexit. It arises both in the European Convention 
on Human Rights, to which the UK and every EU27 state will remain a party and in the EU’s 
own Charter of Fundamental Rights. These property rights protect contracts which have an 
economic value on Brexit. Derivative contracts and any unexercised options contained in 
them will have a calculable economic value at any given point and will therefore be 
protected. Similar protections are provided by the international law doctrine of acquired 
rights.49 
As a final example, in September 2017, the European Commission recommended that the 
ESMA become an ‘investigatory hub’ for market abuse cases across the EU. Valdis 
Dombrovskis, the Commissioner responsible for financial stability, financial services and 
capital markets union, said: ‘The EU needs to act as one player so that we can stay ahead of 
the curve. More integrated financial supervision will make the Economic and Monetary 
Union more resilient’.50 Organisation based in London would inevitably be caught up in this. 
In addition to the burdens imposed by EU financial regulation, there is another important 
factor that is limiting the growth of Europe’s capital markets and that, according to Larry 
Fink is Europe’s ‘excessive reliance’ (around 70%) on borrowing from banks and insurers to 
fund growth.51 He claims that the problems European companies face when accessing bond 
and equity markets have ‘stifled economic recovery’ on the continent: ‘In the years since the 
crisis, much of Europe’s economic potential has been locked up. Strengthening capital 
markets and retirement systems can help unlock that potential, and doing so will be vital to 
Europe’s economic future’. He also argues that European bond markets are complicated by 
different insolvency laws across member states: ‘The lack of a unified European corporate 
bond market raises costs for companies, deters investors and holds down liquidity’. While 
praising the European Commission’s efforts to unify European capital markets – under the 
Capital Markets Union project – he warns that the EU is ‘pulling itself in two directions’, 
claiming that other initiatives, such as new capital rules for insurers under Solvency II, could 
‘severely restrict a key source of funding for European companies. While a long-term 
objective is greater funding from capital markets, limiting insurance companies’ capacity for 
                                                 
49 Continuity of Contracts and Business on a ‘Hard’ Brexit: Human Rights and Reverse Solicitation to the 
Rescue!, 31 October  2017; http://www.shearman.com/en/newsinsights/publications/2017/10/continuity-
contracts-business-on-hard-brexit 
50 Lucy McNulty (2017) EU wants to supercharge its top financial regulator, Financial News, 25 September. 
51 Borrowing from banks and insurers has long been the preferred financing model on the continent. 
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investment before capital markets are fully developed could significantly damage growth’.52  
A 2017 study by New Financial found that Europe’s share of global capital market and 
banking business has fallen over the previous 10 years in 20 out of 21 sectors.53 
 
So the Single Market – promoted as the jewel in the crown of the European Union – has not 
so far delivered the wage and price flexibility nor the degree of labour and capital mobility 
that would help to compensate for the lack of monetary and fiscal tools needed for the 
Eurozone to operate as an OCA. In addition, the European Commission has developed a 
limitless appetite for responding to the problems that arise from this with even more 
bureaucratic solutions accompanied by even more complex regulations.54 
Figure 1: Eurozone Annual GDP Growth Rate 1999-2017 
 
So how has the Eurozone fared since its introduction in 1999? 
Figure 1 shows that the Eurozone’s average annual GDP growth rate between 1999 and 2017 
was just 0.25%. By contrast, the average annual GDP growth rates in the UK and US were 
around 2%, despite both countries experiencing much bigger recessions in 2008-09 – see 
Figures 2 and 3.   
                                                 
52 James Shotter and Thomas Hale (2017) Larry Fink calls for Europe to bolster its capital markets: ‘Excessive 
reliance’ on banks and insurers to fund growth hobbling region’s economy, Financial Times, 17 January. 
53 William Wright and Panagiotis Asimakopoulos (2017) A Decade of Change in Capital Markets, October. 
Europe’s share of global equity trading, M&A activity, IPOs, stock-market value, assets under management, and 
hedge fund assets have fallen by between 25% and 50% since 2007. In 2006, 14 of the 20 largest banks in the 
world were European, with Europe accounting for 58% of global banking assets. By 2017, the share was 32% 
and only eight European banks were in the top 20. The total assets of the largest European banks have dropped 
by more than a quarter in real terms, while the assets of banks from the rest of the world have more than 
doubled. Revenues at European investment banks have halved in real terms, twice the size of the fall in US 
investment banks. Their share of global revenues is down from 45% to around a third, with no European bank in 
the top five for revenues in 2017 (William Wright (2017) The decline and fall of European capital markets, 
Financial News, 18 October). 
54 MiFID II contains 1.4 million paragraphs. 
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Figure 2: UK Annual GDP Growth Rate 1999-2017 
 
 
Figure 3: US Annual GDP Growth Rate 1999-2017 
 
Even more striking is the unemployment rate. The Eurozone unemployment rate has 
averaged more than 9.5% between 1999 and 2017 (Figure 4), while the UK and US 
unemployment rates have averaged 6% (Figures 5 and 6). From the start of the Great 
Recession in 2008, Eurozone unemployment rose from a base of just over 7% to a peak of 
12% in 2013, and has only fallen slowly since then to reach 9% in 2017.  By contrast, US 
unemployment rose sharply from 5% to 10% between 2008 and 2010, but then immediately 
began declining rapidly since then to reach 4.5% in 2017 (Figure 6).  This reflects the much 
greater flexibility of the US labour market: US workers are rapidly fired in a recession, but 
are also promptly rehired when better times come along if they are flexible in terms of wages 
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and job location. The improved flexibility of the UK labour market is also apparent: Figure 5 
shows that UK unemployment rose sharply from 5% to 8% and stayed at that level for three 
years, before falling steadily to reach 4.75% in 2017. The Eurozone labour market is sclerotic 
in comparison. 
Figure 4: Eurozone Unemployment Rate 1999-2017 
 
 
Figure 5: UK Unemployment Rate 1999-2017 
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Figure 6: US Unemployment Rate 1999-2017 
 
Even more striking still is youth unemployment.  The Eurozone youth unemployment rate has 
averaged more than 19% between 1999 and 2017 and reached almost 25% at the worst point 
of the Great Recession in 2013;55 it was still 19% in 2017 (Figure 7). The greater flexibilities 
of the UK and US labour markets are also apparent from Figs. 8 and 9: in both countries, 
youth unemployment in 2017 was well below the historical average. 
Figure 7: Eurozone Youth Unemployment Rate 1999-2017 
 
 
                                                 
55 In some Mediterranean countries, the youth unemployment rate exceeded 50%, e.g., Spain with 53% and 
Greece with 52% (https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/08/which-countries-have-the-highest-rates-of-youth-
unemployment/). 
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Figure 8: UK Youth Unemployment Rate 1999-2017 
Figure 9: US Youth Unemployment Rate 1999-2017 
 
Next, we look at government debt to GDP ratios. Figure 10 shows that the Eurozone 
countries in aggregate have never been below the Maastricht 60% limit during the entire 
existence of the euro. The average ratio is 76% and the current ratio is almost 90%. Figure 11 
shows that the worst offenders in 2015 were largely the western and southern states of 
Ireland, France, Spain, Belgium, Cyprus, Portugal, Italy and Greece. Greece has a national 
debt of 175% of its GDP. As John Whittaker and Bernard Connolly (2003) point out: ‘the 
euro has enabled fiscally-lax governments to gain from Germany’s reputation for fiscal and 
monetary prudence. All governments face continual pressure to tax less and spend more. 
Membership of the EMU “club” dilutes the financial discipline that would be faced by an 
independent government and makes it more likely that some governments will succumb to 
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this pressure. …It is now clear that the Stability [and Growth] Pact is not being observed’.56 
Figures 12 and 13 show that the UK and US, despite having an independent government, also 
both perform badly using this metric. 
Figure 10: Eurozone Government Debt to GDP Ratio 1999-2017 
Figure 11: Individual Eurozone Government Debt to GDP Ratios in 2015 
 
                                                 
56 John Whittaker and Bernard Connolly (2003) What Will Happen to the Euro, Economic Affairs, 23(1): 66-71. 
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Figure 12: UK Government Debt to GDP Ratio 1999-2017 
 
 
Figure 13: US Government Debt to GDP Ratio 1999-2017 
 
Another piece of evidence comes from an examination of the trend changes in rates of per 
capita real GDP amongst the Eurozone member states. As previously mentioned, the EU is 
relying on a combination of market forces (in particular, labour and capital mobility) and 
structural and investment funds to achieve long-run convergence of per capita GDP. If this 
policy is successful, there will be a ‘catch-up’ effect that dominates, with the poorer regions 
catching up over time with the richer regions. This could lead to more highly correlated 
business cycles in the different regions of the EU, leading to Mundell’s first condition being 
satisfied endogenously after the introduction of currency union. On the other hand, the same 
policy could equally well lead to the domination of an ‘agglomeration’ effect – the tendency 
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of capital and skills to concentrate in wealthier areas which then become even wealthier. An 
example of this is the German car industry, which has used its dominant position in the 
German market to create a dominant position in the Eurozone. This could lead to an increase 
in specialisation which would reduce the correlation in business cycles between members and 
increase the vulnerability to differential macroeconomic shocks within the currency union.57  
Figure 14 shows the states, mainly in Central and Eastern Europe, where the ‘catch-up’ effect 
dominates, while Figure 15 shows some of the countries where the ‘agglomeration’ effect 
dominates – these are Germany, Benelux, the Nordics and Austria. There is still a wide 
divergence between living standards within the Eurozone and a number of studies have 
shown the overall dominance of the ‘agglomeration’ effect.58 The implication of this is that the 
core countries will continue to grow by attracting capital and the highest quality labour, while the 
peripheral countries will lag behind, despite the Stability and Growth Pact. 
Figure 14: Per capita GDP relative to the EU average in countries where the catch-up effect 
dominates 
 
Source: European Commission 
 
 
 
                                                 
57 P. Kenen (1969) The Theory of Optimum Currency Areas: An Eclectic View. In R. Mundell and R. Swoboda, 
A. (eds.) Monetary Problems of the International Economy, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 41-60; Paul 
Krugman, (1991) Geography and Trade, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. 
58 Hiroya Akiba and Yukihiro Iida (2009) Monetary Unions and Endogeneity of the OCA Criteria, Global 
Economic Review, 38, 101-116;  Simon Tilford (2017) Is the EU's Single Market leading to Convergence or 
Divergence?, Centre for European Reform, 4 April. 
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 Figure 15: Per capita GDP relative to the EU average in countries where the agglomeration 
effect dominates 
 
Source: European Commission 
 
Two countries, in particular, stand out as being in deep trouble in the Eurozone – Greece and 
Italy. Greece’s GDP has fallen by 26% since the GFC.59 Greece’s problems are well known.  
What is less well known is the plight of Italy, one of the founding members of the EU. The 
IMF’s World Economic Outlook predicts that Italy’s per capita GDP as a percentage of the 
EU average will fall from 119% in 1999 to 88% in 2021.  This contrasts with Poland whose 
relative income over the same period will rise from 43% to 77%.60 The main reason for 
Italy’s predicament appears to be that aggregate labour productivity abruptly stopped 
growing after 1995 on account of the failure of a non-meritocratic managerial system to 
capitalise on the information and communications technology (ITC) revolution.61 A 
secondary reason is the drag on economic growth caused by Italy’s huge expenditure on state 
pension provision, amounting to 16% of GDP, the second highest level in the EU after 
Greece. In 2011, in an attempt to curtail the growth in pension spending, the government 
increased the state pension age to 67 from 2019, but the Italian parliament is debating 
whether to exclude certain groups of workers, such as teachers, nurses and building sector 
workers from this increase.62 
A further piece of evidence comes from the volume of intra-EU trade. Various studies have 
shown that this did increase after 1999 when the euro was introduced, but there are widely 
differing estimates of the size of the increase. Using different models and measures, these 
                                                 
59http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Unemployment_statistics; 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode=tec00115&plugin=1 
60 Simon Tilford (2017) Is the EU's Single Market leading to Convergence or Divergence?, Centre for European 
Reform, 4 April. 
61 Bruno Pellegrino and Luigi Zingales (2017) Diagnosing the Italian Disease, NBER Working Paper no. 
w23964. 
62 Carlo Moreolo (2017) Italy considers unwinding ‘Fornero’ law’s state pension age rise, IPE, 4 December. 
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studies showed that intra-EU trade increased from an average of 15% of EU GDP between 
1988 and 1998 to 20% between 1999 and 2009,63 or by between 3% and 40%, compared with 
bilateral trade between countries that had not adopted the euro.64 So the degree of economic 
integration did increase after 1999, but the extent could well be lower than previously hoped.  
 
But how much of this increase is due to the euro itself and how much is due the introduction 
of the Single Market? As previously mentioned, there is little evidence that the Single Market 
has so far helped to develop an integrated EU-wide market in services. In 2015, intra-EU and 
extra-EU service exports to the EU were 6.9% and 5.9% of EU GDP, respectively, a 
difference of just 1%. Further, exports of services to the EU by countries outside the EU have 
grown at a faster rate (0.5% p.a.) than those of EU members to each other.65 So the increase 
in intra-EU trade must have been almost entirely in the form of goods. It also seems to be 
almost entirely the result of the euro, since the Single Market itself is ‘not visible in the 
macro statistics…. the data are telling us a different story – that the Single Market is a giant 
economic non-event, for both the EU and the UK’.66, 67 
 
This is confirmed by the absence of aggregate productivity growth in the EU. The idea that 
the Eurozone and the Single Market ‘would transform EU economic performance has proved 
to be wide of the mark: there is no indication in the growth of output or productivity… that 
would support this contention’.68 The IMF has also recently pointed out that ‘stagnant 
productivity growth has impeded the adjustment process in the euro area and contributed to 
stalling income convergence among countries. [It] urged countries to press ahead with 
                                                 
63 Paul Krugman, Maurice Obstfeld and Marc Melitz (2012) International Economics: Theory and Policy, 
Pearson Education Limited, Harlow. 
64 Maurice J.G. Bun and Franc J.G.M. Klaassen (2002). Has the Euro Increased Trade?, Tinbergen Institute 
Discussion Paper No. 02-108/2, University of Amsterdam; Alejandro Micco, Ernesto Stein and Guillermo 
Ordoñez (2003)  The Currency Union Effect on Trade: Early Evidence from EMU, Inter-American 
Development Bank Working Paper #490;  R. Baldwin, F. Skudelny and D. Taglioni (2005) Trade Effects of the 
Euro: Evidence from Sectoral Data, ECB Working paper Series, nr. 446; Maurice J.G. Bun and Franc J.G.M. 
Klaassen (2007) The Euro Effect on Trade is not as Large as Commonly Thought, Oxford Bulletin of Economics 
and Statistics, 69, 473–496. The latter study argues that ‘Existing studies on the impact of the euro on goods 
trade report increments between 5% and 40%. These estimates are based on standard panel gravity models for 
the level of trade. We show that the residuals from these models exhibit upwards trends over time for the euro 
countries, and that this leads to an upward bias in the estimated euro effect. To correct for that, we extend the 
standard model by including a time trend that may have different effects across country-pairs. This results in an 
estimated euro impact of only 3%’. 
65 Michael Burrage (2017) It’s Quite OK to Walk Away: A review of the UK’s Brexit options with the help of 
seven international databases, Civitas, April; Michael Burrage (2017) The Single Market promised much, but 
delivered little, CAPX, 27 April; Michael Burrage (2017) The disadvantages of Single Market membership 
remain as clear as ever, BrexitCentral, 16 July.  
66 Wolfgang Münchau (2015) Would it actually matter if we left the EU?, Financial Times, 18 June. 
67 The UK, in particular, has seen little economic benefit from the Single Market: ‘UK goods exports to the 11 
fellow founding members of the Single Market have grown over the years 1993-2015 at a compound annual 
growth rate (CAGR) of just 1.0%. This compares unfavourably with the mean growth rate of the goods exports 
of Canada, Japan, Singapore and the US and 10 other non-member countries trading with the same 11 founding 
members under WTO rules, who had a CAGR of 1.93%, which is almost twice as high. It also compares 
unfavourably with UK goods exports to the 111 countries with which it trades under WTO rules. These have 
grown over the same 23 years nearly three times faster, at a CAGR of 2.88%’ (Michael Burrage (2017) The 
disadvantages of Single Market membership remain as clear as ever, BrexitCentral, 16 July).  
68 Ali M. El-Agraa and Brian Ardy (2011, pp.110-112) The European Union: Economics and Policies, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
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structural reforms to improve productivity. Such reforms can have a larger impact in 
countries with lower productivity levels, thereby promoting income convergence and 
reducing competitiveness gaps’.69 
 
Professor Nicholas Crafts, the economic historian from Warwick University, has pointed out 
that the Eurozone aimed to improve trade and growth, but it is not equipped to handle a 
depressed economy. He argues that policy is needed to escape a liquidity trap, either by 
unconventional monetary policy or a strong fiscal stimulus. But the Eurozone cannot deliver 
either, and the ECB is the wrong central bank for a depression, evidenced by its slow move to 
quantitative easing (QE)70,71  He concludes that ‘survival entails serious reform: a fully 
federal solution and deep economic integration, but this is hard to achieve’.72 
 
Even strong supporters of the euro project concede that ‘Some important expected benefits 
have not yet fully materialised. With the euro, we would expect greater price transparency to 
reduce price discrimination and decrease market segmentation, therefore fostering 
competition across the euro area. This effect is still missing in several markets for goods and 
services (for example, we still don’t have a full convergence of car prices). The impact of 
internet-based providers that can sell and ship their merchandise across countries is also still 
modest. To put this differently, the service industry has not yet reaped the full possible 
benefits from EMU’.73 
Is the Eurozone an OCA? 
It soon became clear that most of Mundell’s conditions would fail to be satisfied in the 
Eurozone. 
 
Its different regions do not have similar business cycles, so when the ECB, which is located 
in Frankfurt, initially set a low European-wide interest rate to suit the economic conditions in 
the core Eurozone countries, in particular Germany, this led to an unsustainable boom – 
especially a property boom – in peripheral countries, such as Ireland and Spain. Higher 
interest rates were needed in these two countries to curtail the boom. This did not happen and 
instead both countries experienced a construction-led economic collapse that gravely 
damaged their banking systems when the Great Recession started in 2008. This contributed to 
                                                 
69 International Monetary Fund (2017) Euro Area Policies: Article IV Consultation, Country Report No. 17/235, 
July. 
70 Quantitative easing is an unconventional form of monetary policy where a central bank creates new money 
electronically to buy financial assets, like government bonds. This will raise the prices of these financial assets 
and lower their yields. The hope is that the resulting increase in financial wealth and the lower returns on 
savings will lead to an increase in private sector spending in the economy; 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/monetarypolicy/pages/qe/default.aspx 
71 The problems with implementing QE in the Eurozone are discussed below. 
72 Britain and Europe: The Political and Economic Repercussions of the Crisis, British Academy Conference, 23 
June 2015; http://ukandeu.ac.uk/explainers/britain-and-europe-the-political-and-economic-repercussions-of-the-
crisis/ 
73 Francesco Paolo Mongelli (2008) European Economic and Monetary Integration, and the Optimum Currency 
Area Theory, Economic Papers 302, Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, European 
Commission. 
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the European sovereign debt crisis which started in 2009 and has not yet finished. Most 
significantly, the original EMU agreement had a ‘no bailout clause’.74 In other words, there 
was going to be no system at EU level for dealing with the consequences of the distortions to 
the peripheral economies caused by the operation of a single European-wide monetary policy 
– just as there was no formal system for redistributing trade surpluses and deficits within the 
Eurozone. Instead, each member state was expected to rely on market forces alone to deal 
with any economic or banking crisis that Eurozone membership throws up. In the event, Irish 
and Spanish GDP contracted by 15.6% and 5.3%, respectively, between 2008 and 2010, and 
the Irish banking industry collapsed and was almost completely nationalised in 2009. While, 
the short-term impact of the crisis was less severe in Spain – it did not have to enter a full 
IMF financial stability programme – the longer term impact was worse and Spain’s 
unemployment rate remains well above that of Ireland.75 The experience of the GFC shows 
that the Eurozone is a long way from satisfying the OCA criteria endogenously – it does not 
have the market flexibilities or the stabilising policy mechanisms to deal with economic 
shocks. The consequences are flat lining GDP growth and persistently high unemployment in 
the peripheral states and a perpetual banking crisis across the whole Eurozone. 
 
The fact that the Eurozone is not an OCA was recognised as far back as the 1990s by 
economists Milton Friedman and Martin Feldstein. Friedman wrote: ‘Europe exemplifies a 
situation unfavourable to a common currency. It is composed of separate nations, speaking 
different languages, with different customs, and having citizens feeling far greater loyalty and 
attachment to their own country than to a common market or to the idea of Europe’.76 
Feldstein argued that the economic costs were so high, that a decision to adopt a single 
currency would be a political decision.77 We will return to this point after we examine how 
Target2 works. 
How does Target2 work? 
Consider a German manufacturer (A) who banks with Deutsche Bank and an Italian 
consumer (B) who banks with Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena (MPS).78 Also involved are 
the German central bank (Bundesbank), the Italian central bank (Banca d’Italia) and the ECB. 
A sells €100 worth of goods to B, but B does not have the money to pay for these goods. So 
B borrows €100 from MPS. MPS, in turn, increases its refinancing with Banca d’Italia by 
€100 (i.e., borrows €100 from the Italian central bank). The €100 is transferred via Target2 to 
the Bundesbank. The Bundesbank receives a credit of €100 from the ECB and Banca d’Italia 
                                                 
74 The ‘no bailout clause’ was enshrined in Articles 123 and 125 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (which replaced the Treaty of Rome). 
75 Michelle Norris and Michael Byrne (2015) Asset Price Keynesianism, Regional Imbalances and the Irish and 
Spanish Housing Booms and Busts, UCD Geary Institute For Public Policy Discussion Paper Series 
WP2015/14, July; http://www.ucd.ie/geary/static/publications/workingpapers/gearywp201514.pdf 
76 The Times, 19 November 1997. 
77 Martin Feldstein (1992) Europe’s Monetary Union: The case against EMU, The Economist, 13 June. This 
view is also shared by Charles Goodhart (1998) The Two Concepts of Money: Implications for the Analysis of 
Optimal Currency Areas, European Journal of Political Economy, 14, 407-432. 
78 The world’s oldest bank founded in 1472. 
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receives a debit. The Bundesbank transfers €100 to Deutsche Bank which, in turn, reduces its 
refinancing with the Bundesbank (i.e., receives a claim for €100 against the German central 
bank). Deutsche Bank credits A’s account with €100.  
To reiterate, the importation of goods to Italy from Germany – which leads to or increases 
both a current account surplus in Germany and a current account deficit in Italy – has been 
financed by MPS creating liquidity in the form of a loan deposited in B’s bank account. The 
liquidity creation results in a Target2 debit for Banca d’Italia and a Target2 credit for the 
Bundesbank.   
In this example, Target2 turns the private debt of an Italian consumer into the national debt79 
of the Italian government owed to the other national governments in the Eurozone (via their 
ownership of their NCBs which, in turn, own the ECB):80, 81 
Italy’s national debt to Eurozone governments =  
Italian government bonds held by other Eurozone national central banks and 
the ECB 
+ Target2 liability of Banca d’Italia (owed to the ECB)                                (1) 
The only way of extinguishing a Target2 liability is through private financial inflows. This is 
because an increase in a Target2 liability is equal to the overall balance of payments deficit:82 
Increase in Target2 liability of Banca d’Italia =  
Net redemptions of Italian government bonds held by other Eurozone national 
central banks and the ECB83 
+ Interest on Italian government bonds held by other Eurozone national central 
banks and the ECB 
+ Net private financial outflows                                                                      (2) 
                                                 
79 Defined to include Banca d’Italia’s Eurosystem liabilities. 
80 Adapted from John Whittaker (2016, equation (1)) Eurosystem Debts do Matter, Lancaster University 
Management School, 1 February. Whittaker points out that ‘Eurosystem debts are a peculiar form of debt with 
no contract or understanding about the terms of repayment. This implies that a NCB cannot default on its 
Eurosystem liability because it has no obligation to repay.  A country’s intra-Eurosystem liabilities are 
nonetheless loans from other countries. For a country that has received official loans, its intra-Eurosystem 
liabilities should therefore be added to its official loans’. This contrasts with ‘the US where there is annual 
settlement of the inter-district balances of the Feds (Federal Reserve Banks), using Federal government debt or 
agency debt. The US system also differs from the Eurosystem in that the Feds are not associated with states: 
each Fed deals with banks in several states and Fed profits go to the US government. Intra-Eurosystem 
settlement would be infeasible because debtor NCBs do not have sufficient suitable assets’. 
81 This equation is valid if there is no banknote adjustment, otherwise the final term in the equation is replaced 
by Eurosystem liability of Banca d’Italia = Target2 liability of Banca d’Italia less the banknote adjustment. If 
Banca d’Italia has issued a lower value of banknotes than its allocation, this reduces its Eurosystem liability to 
the ECB (and vice versa). The role of banknotes is discussed in Appendix A, but for ease of understanding, we 
will assume a zero banknote adjustment in the main body of the paper, implying that the Eurosystem liability of 
Banca d’Italia is equal to its Target2 liability. 
82 Adapted from John Whittaker (2016, equation (2)) Eurosystem Debts do Matter, Lancaster University 
Management School, 1 February. 
83 The redemption of an Italian government bond held by other Eurozone national central banks and the ECB 
will lead to an identical increase the Target2 liability of Banca d’Italia with no net change in Italian national 
indebtedness to other Eurozone governments.  
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where net private financial outflows equals the private-sector balance of payments deficit, 
which, in turn, equals the sum of the private current account deficit and net private capital 
outflows (unrelated to trade) on both the capital and financial accounts (including private 
transactions in financial assets).84   
Equations (1) and (2) imply:85 
Increase in Italian national debt to other Eurozone governments =  
Interest on national debt to other Eurozone governments 
– Net private financial inflows                                                                         (3) 
This shows that private financial inflows (e.g., a current account surplus or net investment 
inflows or lending by other Eurozone banks to Italian banks) are the only way of reducing 
Italian national indebtedness to other Eurozone governments.  
Suppose B never repays its loan of €100 to MPS,86  then all that happens is that Target2 
records a permanent debit against Banca d’Italia of €100 and records a permanent credit for 
the Bundesbank of €100. ‘Since central bank reserves are perceived as the ultimate safe 
assets’,87 everyone is happy. The Italian consumer is happy because he now has the use of 
goods that are never ultimately paid for. MPS is happy because it has been bailed out by 
Banca d’Italia for another non-performing loan. Banca d’Italia has a liability against the ECB 
which will never be extinguished. The Bundesbank holds an asset from the Italian 
government that is ‘risk-free’. And Deutsche Bank has paid the German exporter for his 
splendid efforts in increasing Germany’s trade surplus yet again. 
Figure 16 shows the Target2 balances of Germany and Italy since 2001. Three phases are 
clearly visible. Prior to 2007, there is very little net Target2 activity. The reason for this is 
that during the early years of the euro’s existence, commercial banks in core countries, such 
as Germany, were happy to lend to commercial banks in peripheral countries, such as Italy, 
Ireland and Spain, through the international inter-bank market on an unsecured basis and this 
did not involve Target2.  
This market (and the wholesale money markets more generally) dried up in August 2007 at 
the beginning of the GFC.88 This was the first significant asymmetric shock to the Eurozone, 
                                                 
84 The public-sector balance of payments deficit = net redemptions + interest. 
85 Adapted from John Whittaker (2016, equation (3)) Eurosystem Debts do Matter, Lancaster University 
Management School, 1 February. 
86 Or equivalently, keeps rolling over its loan with the bank without any real intention of repaying it – a practice 
known as ‘evergreening’. 
87 ‘Sovereign debt in the euro area: too safe or too risky?’, Keynote address by Benoît Cœuré, member of the 
Executive Board of the ECB, at Harvard University's Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies in 
Cambridge, MA, 3 November 2016; https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2016/html/sp161103.en.html. 
According to another Executive Board member: ‘The only risk-free assets in the euro area are the ECB’s own 
liabilities’, see ‘Public sector security purchases and monetary dominance in a monetary union without a fiscal 
union’, Speech by Peter Praet, member of the Executive Board of the ECB, at the Conference The ECB and Its 
Watchers XVI, Contribution to the Panel on Low-interest-rate Policy and Non-standard Monetary Policy 
Measures: Effectiveness and Challenges, Frankfurt am Main, 11 March 2015; 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2015/html/sp150311_1.en.html 
88 It has since returned but only on a fully collateralised basis and it is less expensive for the banking system to 
use Target2. 
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since the euro’s introduction and provided striking evidence that the Eurozone failed to 
satisfy Mundell’s first condition for an OCA. The second phase in Figure 16 covers the 
period of the GFC and its aftermath between 2007 and 2014.  The GFC led to massive capital 
flight by the residents of peripheral Eurozone countries whose banks were perceived to be in 
difficulties and Target2 facilitated this. Figure 16 shows that Italian residents moved 
significant amounts of money from their accounts in Italian banks to accounts opened in 
German banks. As a result, there was a fall in reserves held by the Italian banks. To pay their 
depositors, Italian banks increased their refinancing with and received liquidity from the 
Banca d’Italia. The German banks increased their reserves and reduced their refinancing with 
the Bundesbank. Banca d’Italia receives a Target2 debit, while the Bundesbank gets a 
corresponding credit.89  
The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) – the global central bank to the world’s national 
central banks – concedes that in the period between the GFC and mid-2012, ‘Target2 
balances grew strongly due to intra-euro area capital flight. At the time, sovereign market 
strains spiked and redenomination risk came to the fore in parts of the euro area. Private 
capital fled from Ireland, Italy, Greece, Portugal and Spain into markets perceived to be safer, 
such as Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands’.90  Figure 17 illustrates this for Spain 
and Luxembourg in addition to Germany and Italy. In December 2017, the Bundesbank and 
the Luxembourg central bank had Target2 credits of € 871bn and €192bn, respectively, while 
the ECB, the Bank of Spain and Banca d’Italia had debits of €229bn, €374bn and €433bn, 
respectively.91  In addition, no interest is received or paid on these credits and debits.92 
The third phase in Figure 16 covers the period of Eurozone quantitative easing (QE) after 
March 2015. The Great Recession that followed the GFC persisted in the Eurozone and, in 
March 2015, the ECB began a policy of QE to boost the Eurozone economies. QE is 
principally implemented by the NCBs buying their own government bonds in proportion to 
their capital key, i.e., in proportion to the NCB’s share in the capital of the ECB.93 The bond 
sellers in deficit countries immediately transfer the proceeds to surplus countries via Target2, 
in large part because of concerns about the credit worthiness of their banking system.94 
Despite the clear evidence of this in Figures 16 and 17, BIS argues that these ‘record Target2 
balances should be viewed as a benign by-product of the decentralised implementation of the 
asset purchase programme [as part of the ECB’s QE programme]’.95  
 
 
                                                 
89 To reiterate, capital flight is a private financial outflow which increases Italy’s balance of payments deficit 
and hence its Target2 liability. 
90 Bank for International Settlements (2017) Quarterly Report, March; www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1703a.htm.   
91 http://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/reports.do?node=1000004859 
92 Since 16 March 2016, the refinancing rate has been 0.0%; 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/policy_and_exchange_rates/key_ecb_interest_rates/html/index.en.html 
93 See Table B1 in the Appendix B. Later, we show that the capital key shares are being routinely violated in the 
ECB’s QE programme.  
94 Ambrose Evans-Pritchard discusses this matter in more detail below. 
95 Bank for International Settlements (2017) Quarterly Report, March ; www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1703a.htm.  
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Figure 16: Target2 balances of Germany and Italy (€bn), April 2001 – December 201796 
 
The reality is rather different. The ECB sets collateral standards for refinancing – including 
for QE purchases – but has progressively weakened these, to enable peripheral NCBs to 
continue providing liquidity, by, for example, reducing the minimum credit ratings for 
government debt and other securities, and accepting banks own-issued bonds with a 
government guarantee. When the quality of available collateral became so poor that further 
easing could no longer be justified, the ECB allowed NCBs to extend Emergency Liquidity 
Assistance (ELA)97 where the NCB itself approves the collateral, although the credit risk is 
supposed to be borne by the NCB itself rather than pooled via the ECB, and there is a lot of 
room for judgement and interpretation.98 
 
 
                                                 
96 http://www.eurocrisismonitor.com/; 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/policy_and_exchange_rates/target_balances/html/index.en.html 
97 See the ECB’s ELA Procedures; https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/201402_elaprocedures.en.pdf 
98 Despite the Eurosystem Credit Assessment Framework (ECAF); 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/paym/coll/risk/ecaf/html/index.en.html. See Karl Whelan (2015) What’s Going On 
with Greece and the ECB?, Medium.com: Bull Market, 1 February; John Whittaker (2016) Eurosystem Debts do 
Matter, Lancaster University Management School, 1 February. 
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Figure 17: Target2 balances in the Eurozone (€bn), April 2007 – December 201799 
 
 
To illustrate, consider again the Italian bank that made the €100 loan to the Italian consumer 
to import goods from Germany. The bank can use that loan – which is an asset of the bank – 
as collateral for a new loan (less a haircut) to another Italian consumer wishing to import 
goods from Germany. But the bank has considerable flexibility in choosing the size of the 
haircut. The smaller the haircut, the larger does Banca d’Italia’s resulting Eurosystem debit 
become. Target2 debits are therefore an unambiguous sign that liquidity is being created in 
one part of the Eurozone to finance the acquisition of goods imported from another part.  
Despite official denials, this is de facto a transfer from a surplus member of the Eurozone to a 
deficit member, since the credit status of many of these loan is so weak that they are 
extremely unlikely to be repaid.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
99 http://www.eurocrisismonitor.com/; 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/policy_and_exchange_rates/target_balances/html/index.en.html 
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How Target2 bails out the euro 
Given that there is no limit to the size of Target2 balances and there is also no requirement 
for central bank accounts with Target2 to be settled, it is clear that Target2 has since 2007 
become the bailout system that keeps the euro afloat. It is the facility through which 
Mundell’s fourth criterion – the system of regional redistributions whereby regions with trade 
deficits acquire funding from regions with trade surpluses – operates in the Eurozone. Recall 
that a country’s balance of payments deficit is identical to the increase in its Target2 debits 
and Target2 debits never need to be repaid. Target2 also facilitates private transactions in 
financial assets, i.e., capital flight, whenever asymmetric shocks result in a loss of confidence 
in a particular Eurozone member’s banking system. 
 
Initially, the ECB refused to accept that Target2 had become a bailout system, insisting that it 
was simply a payments system for the Eurozone. But it did not publish the Target2 balances 
of the individual Eurozone members’ NCBs. This information was hidden away in the NCBs’ 
balance sheets.  
 
It was the German academic Hans-Werner Sinn100 who first discovered what was going on in 
early 2011 by examining the central banks’ balance sheets. He found that Target2 was far 
more than a simple payments system. It had become intimately involved with the emergence 
of systematic balance of payments surpluses and deficits amongst the Eurozone member 
states, with shifting the refinancing of commercial bank credit from the central banks of 
states with weak economies to the central banks of states with strong economies, and with 
facilitating cross-border private sector capital movements away from states with financially 
weak banks, such as those in Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy, to the stronger core 
banks.  
 
The evidence for this was that the increase in Target2 liabilities of a member state equalled 
the sum of the current account deficit and net capital outflows (as equation (2) above shows). 
Sinn concluded that Target2 was a de facto a bailout system for the euro.101 This claim was 
strongly denied by the ECB. Jürgen Stark, a member of its Executive Board, even went as far 
as saying that some commentators could lose their reputation as serious academics by 
claiming that Target2 functions as a bailout system.102 The ECB refused to publish the 
Target2 balances of the individual Eurozone NCBs until September 2015. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
100 President emeritus at the Ifo Institute and Professor at the University of Munich. 
101 Hans-Werner Sinn (2012) Die Target-Falle: Gefahren für unser Geld und unsere Kinder, Hanser, Munich; 
Hans-Werner Sinn (2014) The Euro Trap: On Bursting Bubbles, Budgets, and Beliefs, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford; Hans-Werner Sinn (2016) ‘Europe’s Secret Bailout’, Project Syndicate, 28 November, 
www.hanswernersinn.de/en/PS_28112016 
102 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TARGET2 
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So Target2 saves the euro? 
Well only up to a point. The recycling of trade surpluses back to deficit economies – 
Mundell’s fourth criterion – could, in principle, fully compensate for the failure of the other 
three criteria to be satisfied, and so could contribute to the euro achieving OCA status. 
Target2 is certainly helping with this, although this was not one of its original aims and is still 
not an officially recognised aim.  
 
But there are huge economic problems in the way that Target2 and the other rescue packages 
for the euro have been operating. 
 
First, Target2 has, since 2007, been helping to convert the private debts of individuals, 
companies and commercial banks into sovereign debts and then monetise them. To illustrate, 
consider the previous example of the German manufacturer (A) and the Italian consumer (B). 
Suppose now that A sells €100 worth of goods to B on credit, so has capital of €100 in the 
form a private-sector Italian debt obligation. Target2 allows the German owner of this illiquid 
debt obligation to repatriate his capital, and, in in doing so, convert private German claims on 
an Italian resident into claims of the Bundesbank on Banca d’Italia via the ECB.  In other 
words, Germany’s risky capital account deficit with Italy – the counterpart to its current 
account surplus – can be transformed into a risk-free asset via Target2. 
 
Governments can also use Target2 for the same purpose. A classic example is the Greek 
government which was unable to raise long-term funding on the bond markets, but could 
continue to finance its deficits through borrowing from its commercial banks by selling them 
short-term treasury bills (e.g., €22.8bn in the year to June 2011, although the ECB imposed a 
treasury bill cap of €15bn in February 2015103). These banks borrowed the funds to do this 
from the Bank of Greece – EU rules prevent the BoG lending directly to the government104 – 
and the BoG, in turn, borrowed the funds from the ECB. Such backdoor funding of the Greek 
government via Target2 can continue indefinitely, so long as Greece stays in the 
Eurozone.105, 106 
 
In other words, Target2 is a way of creating liquidity to keep the Eurosystem afloat. If too 
little liquidity is created, then individuals, companies, banks and the government in a 
peripheral state might be unable to meet its day-to-day bills, the market could mark down the 
price of the government bonds held in the Target2 system as collateral, and taxpayers in 
surplus countries could lose out – in direct proportion to their capital key. If too much 
liquidity is created, this could have inflationary consequences which hits savers. Either way, 
                                                 
103 Peter Spiegel (2015) Tsipras letter to Merkel: the annotated text, Financial Times, 22 March. 
104 By contrast, the UK government can borrow directly from the Bank of England using ‘Ways and Means 
Advances’. 
105 John Whittaker (2011) Eurosystem debts, Greece, and the Role of Banknotes, Lancaster University 
Management School, 14 November. 
106 The banks that do this across the Eurozone also tend to engage in derivatives and other activities, thereby 
adding to the risk in international financial markets. 
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there could be real losses of wealth experienced by savers and/or taxpayers in surplus 
countries.  
 
Second and related to the first point, the debts in Target2 are effectively being mutualised or 
socialised across the Eurozone member states – this, by definition, is what a bailout 
mechanism does – despite this being explicitly ruled out – especially by Germany – when the 
euro was set up. Yet ever since the Eurozone was established, there has been pressure to 
introduce ‘Eurobonds’, bonds that are issued and guaranteed jointly by all 19 Eurozone 
members – in effect, sovereign bonds of the European Union. Again this has been resisted by 
Germany, despite Target2 being essentially an equivalent bailout mechanism. However, the 
European Stability Mechanism – also originally opposed by Germany –  is really just another 
alternative for Eurobonds, since it provides loans to countries in difficulty which are 
collectively guaranteed. As Tyler Durden (2012) puts it: ‘The difference between the three is 
merely of degree. There is more parliamentary control for Eurobonds or the ESM. In the 
ESM, creditor countries have more control over bailouts than with Eurobonds. Interest rates 
differences are also more pronounced with the ESM than with Eurobonds. The ECB wants to 
shift the bailout burden from Target2 to the ESM. Governments prefer to hide the losses on 
taxpayers as long as possible and prefer the ECB to aliment107 deficits. However, all three 
devices serve as bailout systems and form a “transfer union”’.108  
A more recent example of debt mutualisation is European Banking Union (EBU). This was 
also originally opposed by Germany, despite the fact that monetary union was never likely to 
be sustainable without banking union.109 There was, however, a significant difference from 
previous bank rescue attempts and the ESM – private sector agents, including depositors, 
would share the burden alongside taxpayers. EBU began in 2012, comes under the 
governance of the European Banking Authority, and has three components. The first is the 
Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) which is based on the EU's common financial 
regulatory framework. The second is the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM), run by a 
Single Resolution Board (SRB), which establishes rules for restructuring failing banks, taking 
over responsibility for this from the NCBs. To finance the restructuring, the SRB can draw on 
a Single Resolution Fund (SRF) which is funded by the Eurozone banks and has a target 
minimum size of 1% of the covered deposits of all banks in the EBU. The third component, 
deposit insurance, has yet to be agreed.110   
Related to this is the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) which was introduced 
in 2014 to provide authorities with ‘comprehensive and effective arrangements to deal with 
failing banks at national level and cooperation arrangements to tackle cross-border banking 
                                                 
107 Archaic term for feed or maintain. 
108 Tyler Durden (2012) Is TARGET2 A Less Than Thinly Veiled Bailout For Europe's Periphery?, Zerohedge, 
19 June 2012; http://www.zerohedge.com/news/guest-post-target2-less-thinly-veiled-bailout-europes-periphery 
109 John Whittaker has pointed out to us that even with banking union, monetary union is not obviously 
sustainable. 
110 William Rhodes (2016) Eurozone must complete banking union to avert crisis, Financial Times, 28 July; 
Hugo Dixon (2016) EU enters brave new world of bank bail-ins, Reuters, 4 January; 
http://blogs.reuters.com/hugo-dixon/2016/01/04/eu-enters-brave-new-world-of-bank-bail-ins/ 
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failures’. The directive ‘requires banks to prepare recovery plans to overcome financial 
distress. It also grants national authorities powers to ensure an orderly resolution of failing 
banks with minimal costs for taxpayers. The directive includes rules to set up a national 
resolution fund that must be established by each EU country. All financial institutions have to 
contribute to these funds. Contributions are calculated on the basis of the institution's size and 
risk profile. The EU's bank resolution rules ensure that the banks' shareholders and creditors 
pay their share of the costs through a “bail-in” mechanism. If that is still not sufficient, the 
national resolution funds set up under the BRRD can provide the resources needed to ensure 
that a bank can continue operating while it is being restructured’.111 Bank creditors including 
bondholders and depositors (with deposits above €100,000), as part of the bail-in rules, have 
to absorb 8% of the liabilities before any state aid can be used to bail out banks. This is less 
onerous than some previous bail-ins. For example, in July 2013, depositors in Cyprus lost 
47.5% of the value of their bank deposits above €100,000.  
The SRM came into operation on 1 January 2016. Stress tests conducted by the EBA and the 
ECB in 2016 indicated that MPS was insolvent in the ‘adverse case’112 and that Italy alone 
needed €40bn to rescue its banks.113   
In one of the first opportunities to apply the new resolution regime – the rescue of Veneto 
Banca and Banca Popolare di Vicenza by Intesa Sanpaolo114 – no BRRD bail-in was used, 
which would have included senior bonds and unguaranteed deposits, and the banks were 
wound down in insolvency proceedings at national level. The decision not to use a bail-in 
was taken on the grounds that a BRRD resolution was not warranted in the public interest. 
The BRRD was disapplied by the SRB declaring that ‘neither of the banks provide critical 
functions and their failure is not expected to have a significant adverse impact on financial 
stability’ and, as a result, local Italian law was applied, which did not have the 8% bail-in 
requirement.115 The European Commission simultaneously approved state aid for the orderly 
market exit of the two banks allowing Italy to mitigate the effects for the local economy. 
Under local Italian law, only shareholders and junior bondholders participated in the losses as 
required by the state aid rules, although retail junior bondholders who were mis-sold bonds 
may be eligible for compensation. The European Commission takes the view that such 
compensation is an entirely separate consideration to the burden-sharing required by the state 
aid rules. In light of the apparent wiggle-room granted by the new resolution regime, critics 
have accused the SRB and the European Commission of circumventing the no-bail-out 
                                                 
111 https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/banking-and-finance/financial-supervision-and-risk-
management/managing-risks-banks-and-financial-institutions/bank-recovery-and-resolution_en 
112 The total cost of the state bailout of Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena to date is estimated to be €9bn 
(Giovanni Legorano (2017) How Italy’s Monte dei Paschi ended up on the verge of nationalisation, Financial 
News, 10 July). In August 2017, the European Commission agreed that the Italian government should take a 
70% stake in Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena in exchange for €5.4bn.  
113 Across the Eurozone as a whole, non-performing loans account for 5% of total loans (at around €1trn), while 
in some peripheral states, the ratio is as high as 10% (Andrew Fraser (2017) Risks are rising for investors in 
bank debt, Financial News, 20 October). 
114 Italy's second largest bank which received a government loan of  €5.2bn to maintain its capital ratios, while 
the bad assets were put into a ‘bad bank’ backed by a €12bn state guarantee. 
115 Danae Kyriakopoulou (2017) Death in Venice for Banking Union, OMFIF, 28 June. 
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principle and therefore have pushed for the harmonisation of national insolvency laws and a 
further tightening of the state aid rules to avoid something similar happening in future. 
 
Figure 18: Interest rate on two-year German debt116 
 
 
 
Third, even if these are temporary teething troubles that will eventually sort themselves out – 
and supporters of the euro point out that it took well over a century for the dollar to be fully 
adopted in the US – what the Eurosystem cannot deal with on a long term basis is the capital 
flight from the peripheral states to Germany, in particular, conducted through Target2. This is 
causing enormous distortions in Europe’s capital markets as Germany becomes flooded with 
money that it cannot use productively117 and there is a corresponding dearth of funds for 
investment in the peripheral states. The distortion to German interest rates – which have 
become increasingly negative since 2014 – is readily apparent from Figure 18. A study by 
Germany’s Postbank estimates that German savers lost interest income worth €125bn 
between 2011 and 2015 as a result of the ECB’s ultra-low rates and QE.118 There are further 
distortions when investors outside the Eurozone take part in the ECB’s QE exercise, as 
pointed out by Professor Frank Westermann of Osnabrück University: ‘[It results in] a 
significant increase in non-euro area foreign direct investment into Europe. …Investors in 
these countries sell their bonds to the ECB and in return buy equity and real estate, raising 
                                                 
116 Source: Ambrose Evans-Pritchard (2017) Unpayable debts and an existential EU financial crisis – are 
Eurozone central banks still solvent?, Daily Telegraph, 23 February. 
117 Target2 flows into Germany cause German banks to acquire large amounts of reserve deposits at the 
Bundesbank which earn a negative 0.4%. The banks would like to lend these out at positive interest but, 
collectively, they are stuck with these reserve balances 
(https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/policy_and_exchange_rates/key_ecb_interest_rates/html/index.en.html). 
118 Reported in Gunnar Beck (2016) Germany discovers some home truths about Brexit, Wall Street Journal, 14 
September.   
35 
 
equity and house prices in many euro area countries. Most recently, offshore financial centres 
have become the largest net asset holder vis-à-vis the euro area in the ECB’s statistics. Their 
current balance is €500bn. Before the 2007-08 financial crisis, this balance was close to 
zero’.119 
Fourth, considerable risk is inserted into the system as a result of the Basel II rules which 
effectively treat all sovereign debt as risk free for regulatory capital purposes: ‘The CRR120 
does not grant a general zero risk weight for sovereign debt. However, owing to the 
analogous adoption of exemptions stated within the Basel II framework, EU regulation de 
facto grants zero risk weights for the majority of debt issued by EU sovereigns. According to 
Article 114(4) of the CRR, “exposures to Member States’ central governments and central 
banks denominated and funded in the domestic currency of that central government and 
central bank shall be assigned a risk weight of 0% in the standardised approach. Because of 
the currency union, the exemption is automatically applicable to all banks within the euro 
area that finance euro-denominated government debt, leading to preferential treatment of the 
respective bonds in spite of actual differences in credit risk’.121 Were that not the case, private 
sector institutions, such as central counterparties, as well as the central banks holding 
government debt, would have to take account of its riskiness by way of significant haircutting 
and, additionally, in the case of the private sector, by holding more regulatory capital against 
it.122 This would make the holding of much of that debt prohibitively expensive, which 
would, in turn, bring an end to the merry-go-round process of it being issued and ‘sold’ to 
member state champion financial institutions.  
One of the main reasons why the ECB wants euro-clearing to be located in the Eurozone is 
because it wants to prevent CCPs haircutting member state bonds, as the London Clearing 
House did in 2011, causing problems in the Eurosystem. The LCH required banks to provide 
extra collateral to deal with possible losses on EU countries’ debt, raising borrowing costs in 
the Eurozone. Christian Noyer, ex governor of the Banque de France said: ‘It fuelled the 
                                                 
119 Frank Westermann (2016) ECB Target2 balances keep rising, OMFIF, 29 November; 
https://www.omfif.org/analysis/commentary/2016/november/ecb-target-2-balances-keep-rising/ 
120 CRD IV - Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR) - 575/2013   
121 European Systemic Risk Board Report on the Regulatory Treatment of Sovereign Exposures, March 2015 
(Section 1.3.1 Risk weights for sovereign assets). 
122 In practice, credit rating agencies frequently change the credit rating on EU government bonds. For example, 
on 13 February 2012, Moody's Investors Service adjusted the sovereign debt ratings of nine EU countries in 
order to reflect their susceptibility to the growing financial and macroeconomic risks emanating from the euro 
area crisis and how these risks exacerbate the affected countries' own specific challenges: 
• Austria: outlook on Aaa rating changed to negative 
• France: outlook on Aaa rating changed to negative 
• Italy: downgraded to A3 from A2, negative outlook 
• Malta: downgraded to A3 from A2, negative outlook 
• Portugal: downgraded to Ba3 from Ba2, negative outlook 
• Slovakia: downgraded to A2 from A1, negative outlook 
• Slovenia: downgraded to A2 from A1, negative outlook 
• Spain: downgraded to A3 from A1, negative outlook 
• United Kingdom: outlook on Aaa rating changed to negative 
(https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-adjusts-ratings-of-9-European-sovereigns-to-capture-downside--
PR_237716) 
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Eurozone crisis at exactly the wrong moment. The mandate of UK regulators was not to 
protect the euro area, it was to protect the City. The increase was not a normal increase, it 
was an explosion of margin calls’.123 However, if euro-clearing is located in the Eurozone, 
then the ECB faces a conflict of interest in actively controlling haircutting and margining in 
its own credits, especially given the incomplete nature of the euro and its underpinning 
structures. 
Fifth and most significantly, Target2 is papering over the cracks of a much more fundamental 
problem which is that it is bailing out ‘uncompetitive econom[ies] with too high prices [since 
they cannot use devaluation to make themselves competitive]. Thanks to this bailout 
mechanism, [these countries do] not have to deregulate labour markets, and reduce 
government spending to adjust prices relatively, but can continue [their] spending spree and 
maintain [their] uncompetitive internal structure’.124 In other words, Mundell’s fourth 
criterion is being used to compensate for the failure of the second and third criteria to operate 
effectively – as driving forces of economic efficiency – in the Eurozone.  
 
Supporters of the euro will continue to argue that Target2 is doing a useful and temporary job 
until the conditions for a fully endogenous OCA emerge and the peripheral states have 
become as efficient as a core state such as Germany.  However, even those at the heart of the 
euro project have come round to accepting that the emperor has no clothes. In late 2011, 
Jürgen Stark recanted and resigned from the Executive Board, along with former Bundesbank 
head Axel Weber, recognising that the ECB had taken on ‘a new role, to fall into panic. It 
gave in to outside pressure ... Together with other central banks, the ECB is flooding the 
market, posing the question not only about how the ECB will get its money back, but also 
how the excess liquidity created can be absorbed globally’.125  
 
Similarly, Otmar Issing, the ECB’s first chief economist and one of the founding fathers of 
monetary union, admits that the ECB is becoming dangerously over-extended and the whole 
euro project is unworkable in its current form:  
 
One day, the house of cards will collapse. The euro has been betrayed by politics, the 
experiment went wrong from the beginning and has since degenerated into a fiscal 
free-for-all that once again masks the festering pathologies. Realistically, it will be a 
case of muddling through, struggling from one crisis to the next. It is difficult to 
forecast how long this will continue for, but it cannot go on endlessly…The Stability 
and Growth Pact has more or less failed. The moral hazard is overwhelming. Market 
discipline is done away with by ECB interventions. There is no fiscal control 
mechanism from markets or politics. This has all the elements to bring disaster for 
monetary union. The no-bailout clause is violated every day and the European 
                                                 
123 Quoted in Alex Hawkes (2017) ‘London must lose euro trading’: On eve of crucial Brexit talks, continental 
bankers close ranks threatening 83,000 jobs in City, Financial Mail on Sunday, 17 June. 
124 Tyler Durden (2012) Is Target2 A Less Than Thinly Veiled Bailout For Europe's Periphery?, Zerohedge, 19 
June; http://www.zerohedge.com/news/guest-post-target2-less-thinly-veiled-bailout-europes-periphery/ 
125 Quoted in ‘ECB in “panic”, say former chief economist Jürgen Stark’, Daily Telegraph, 22 September 2012. 
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Court's approval for bailout measures is simple-minded and ideological.…The ECB 
has crossed the Rubicon and is now in an untenable position, trying to reconcile 
conflicting roles as banking regulator, Troika enforcer in rescue missions and agent 
of monetary policy. Its own financial integrity is increasingly in jeopardy.  
 
The venture began to go off the rails immediately, though the structural damage was 
disguised by the financial boom. There was no speed-up of convergence after 1999 – 
rather, the opposite. From day one, quite a number of countries started working in the 
wrong direction. A string of states let rip with wage rises, brushing aside warnings 
that this would prove fatal in an irrevocable currency union. During the first eight 
years, unit labour costs in Portugal rose by 30% versus Germany. In the past, the 
escudo would have devalued by 30%, and things more or less would be back to where 
they were. Quite a few countries – including Ireland, Italy and Greece – behaved as 
though they could still devalue their currencies. The elemental problem is that once a 
high-debt state has lost 30% in competitiveness within a fixed exchange system, it is 
almost impossible to claw back the ground in the sort of deflationary world we face 
today. It has become a trap. The whole Eurozone structure has acquired a 
contractionary bias. The deflation is now self-fulling. The first Greek rescue in 2010 
was little more than a bailout for German and French banks. It would have been far 
better to eject Greece from the euro as a salutary lesson for all. The Greeks should 
have been offered generous support, but only after it had restored exchange rate 
viability by returning to the drachma. [The fear was a chain-reaction reaching Spain 
and Italy, detonating an uncontrollable financial collapse. This nearly happened on 
two occasions, and remained a risk until Berlin switched tack and agreed to let the 
ECB shore up the Spanish and Italian debt markets in 2012.]  
 
Cloaking it all is obfuscation, political mendacity and endemic denial. Leaders of the 
heavily indebted states have misled their voters with soothing bromides, falsely 
suggesting that some form of fiscal union or debt mutualisation is just around the 
corner. Yet there is no chance of political union or the creation of an EU treasury in 
the forseeable future, which would in any case require a sweeping change to the 
German constitution – an impossible proposition in the current political climate. The 
European project must therefore function as a union of sovereign states, or fail.126 
 
Problems with implementing quantitative easing in the Eurozone 
The ECB’s QE programme began very late in the day in March 2015, well after the GFC 
(2007-08) and the peak of the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis (2011). It is also likely to end 
                                                 
126 Quoted in Ambrose Evans-Pritchard (2016) Euro 'house of cards' to collapse, warns ECB prophet, Daily 
Telegraph, 16 October.   
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much sooner than was originally anticipated – in part because of the way Target 2 was set up 
using capital keys.127 
 
Yanis Varoufakis, the former Greek finance minister, was one of the first commentators to 
recognise that Mario Draghi, president of the ECB, will have to halt QE asset purchases soon 
‘because of a shortage of German bunds. Remember how European quantitative easing 
works: to buy any amount of Italian bonds, Draghi has to buy twice as many bunds. That is 
the only way the ECB could pull off QE “euro-style”. In other words, the only way of 
convincing German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Bundesbank chairman Jens Weidmann to 
allow the ECB to do QE was that it purchased government debt in proportion to GDP or to 
ECB shareholding by member states.128 Same thing. Now, the problem is that bunds are 
running out because [the then] German finance minister Dr Wolfgang Schäuble is not issuing 
them – he is running a surplus. German financial institutions have an obligation to retain the 
bunds they have. So you have excess demand for bunds. This is creating problems for the 
smaller banks in Germany and the pension funds. And that is pushing Draghi into tapering 
already, and why the ECB's programme of QE is going to be withdrawn very soon’.129    
 
A more recent analysis by OMFIF, while accepting Varoufakis’s assessment about the ECB’s 
QE programme, also points out that the rules mentioned by Varoufakis have not actually been 
followed: 
 
Figures for July [see Figure 19] show that, for the fourth month in a row, German 
bonds bought under the European Central Bank’s public sector purchase [i.e., QE] 
programme (PSPP) fell short of the amount allowed by the ‘capital key’ allocation. 
Other countries have also seen significant deviations from the capital key, under 
which bonds are bought in proportion to the share of the ECB capital provided by 
each country. This figure is determined by the size of GDP and population, and is 
adjusted slightly to reflect the ineligibility of Greek bonds given their low credit 
rating.130 
 
Since April, the ECB has bought an additional €4.2bn of Italian bonds and €809m of 
Spanish bonds, against an under-purchase of €1.09bn for Germany and (since May) 
€172m for the Netherlands. The divergence suggests growing difficulties with the 
ECB’s quantitative easing programme and has reignited speculation about a tapering 
of bond purchases. 
 
                                                 
127 In addition, in August 2017, Germany’s constitutional court ruled that the ECB's €2trn QE programme might 
violate EU law and referred the case to the European Court of Justice. However, many commentators, including 
Wolfgang Schäuble, the former German finance minister, have defended the ECB's action and expect the ECJ to 
decide in the ECB's favour. https://www.omfif.org/analysis/commentary/2017/august/germanys-macron-
dilemma/?utm_source=OMFIFweeklyupdate 
128 See Table B1 in Appendix B. 
129 Quoted in Investment Week, 17 May 2017. 
130 This would appear to be the first recognition by the ECB that not all Eurozone government bonds are in fact 
‘risk free’. 
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Figure 19: ECB under-purchasing German bonds, over-purchasing Italian bonds – 
Public Sector Purchase Programme, monthly deviation from adjusted capital key, €m 
 
 
Source: European Central Bank, OMFIF analysis 
 
These figures mark a significant break from the pattern that existed for the two years 
from the start of the PSPP in March 2015 until March 2017. During that period the 
ECB over-purchased German and Dutch bonds by a total of €8.3bn and €2.3bn 
respectively. Italian and Spanish bonds were also over-purchased to compensate for 
the scarcity of bonds in smaller euro area countries, including Cyprus, Estonia and 
Portugal. However, the scale of Italian and Spanish bond over-purchasing has 
increased rapidly this year. Since January the ECB has overshot Italy’s adjusted 
capital key by an average of €920m per month and Spanish bonds by €311m per 
month. This compares with €264m and €181m respectively each month from the start 
of the PSPP to the end of 2016. In July, the over-purchase of Italian bonds reached 
more than €1.2bn, the highest monthly figure to date.  
 
Mario Draghi, president of the ECB, reiterated in late June that the bank remains 
committed to QE through bond purchases. But the longer QE goes on, the greater the 
demand will be for bonds in core countries. In coming months the amount of eligible 
bonds could begin to face significant strains. To avoid a sudden fall in the amount of 
German bonds available, or a politically toxic redistribution of the capital key to 
allow higher allocations to bonds from southern countries, Germany is scaling back 
the rate at which its own bonds are purchased.  
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…As the ECB remains committed to doing ‘whatever it takes’ to return the euro area 
to stability and growth, new tools could be needed as the potential limits of QE edge 
ever closer.131 
 
In October 2017, the ECB announced that it would cut back its €2trn QE programme from 
€60bn132 to €30bn a month of bond purchases from January 2018, but the scheme will be 
extended until September 2018 or longer if needed.133 Mario Draghi said nothing about the 
shortages of German bunds: ‘The recalibration in our asset purchases reflects growing 
confidence in the gradual convergence of inflation rates towards our inflation aim on account 
of the increasingly robust and broad based economic expansion. We did not discuss 
composition and how the asset purchase programme will evolve; however, we will continue 
to buy sizeable quantities of corporate bonds’.134 German lawyer, Gunnar Beck, has 
described this new strategy as little better than ‘hoovering up junk’.135  
 
The cut back in QE is needed for another reason, namely the serious overheating of the 
German economy, which grew at an annualised rate of 3.2% in the fourth quarter of 2017 and 
is experiencing capacity constraints in the form of equipment and labour shortages, as well as 
a real estate bubble in its largest cities. Professor Clemens Fuest of the IFO Institute said: ‘It 
is clear that monetary policy is too expansionary for Germany… We think the ECB should be 
cutting asset purchases to zero by April [2018, six months sooner than planned]’.136 So once 
again we have evidence that the single interest rate set by the ECB in the Eurozone is not 
suitable for any of its economies. While the peripheral economies are still coming out of 
recession – and hence need a low rate of interest – core economies, such as Germany, are 
booming – and hence need a much higher rate to dampen the boom. The Eurozone economies 
 grew at an annualised rate of 2.7% in the fourth quarter of 2017 and unemployment fell to 
7.3%, but this was largely due to QE. The gradual withdrawal of QE, combined with a 
stronger euro and uncertainty about the trade tension between the US and China has reduced 
Eurozone economic growth to just 1.6% in the first quarter of 2018.137 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
131 Ben Robinson (2017) QE challenged by bond limits, OMFIF, 11 August; 
https://www.omfif.org/analysis/commentary/2017/august/qe-challenged-by-bond-
limits/?utm_source=OMFIFweeklyupdate 
132 Reduced from €80bn to €60bn a month in April 2017. 
133 https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/implement/omt/html/index.en.html 
134 Tom Eckett (2017) 'A potential sea change event': ECB to halve €60bn bond buying programme, Investment 
Week, 26 October. 
135 Quoted in Ambrose Evans-Pritchard (2017) German court threatens QE as plans die for euro fiscal union, 
Daily Telegraph, 17 October. 
136 Ambrose Evans-Pritchard (2017) Germany risks havoc of boom and bust, Daily Telegraph, 25 November. 
137 Claire Jones (2018) Eurozone growth hits slowest pace in 18 months, Financial Times, 2 May. 
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Can a country leave the Eurozone?  
The ECB argues that ‘the size of the Target2 balances does not pose additional risk to the 
Eurosystem or the NCBs given the irreversibility of the euro’.138  
 
However, as John Whittaker (2016) points out:139 
 
…the euro is not irreversible. Indeed, … exit risk is an unavoidable feature of 
monetary union. Thus, if a country’s Eurosystem debt presents a risk when it leaves 
the euro, and if there is a non-zero probability that it will leave, then its Eurosystem 
debt is risky. A contingent risk is a risk. 
 
… The departure of any country from monetary union would involve large political 
and financial costs and uncertainty, particularly for that country but also for other 
Eurozone members, given the absence of agreed exit procedures. This makes 
monetary union more durable than a fixed rate regime between separate currencies.  
 
Yet, there must be a limit to the tolerance of creditor countries. There must be some 
threshold level of exposure to Greece or any other debtor country, or expected future 
exposure, beyond which Germany and the other creditors would refuse further credit 
either via the Eurosystem or official loans, accept their losses, and expel.  
 
Despite the ECB’s assertion that monetary union is irreversible, exit risk will always 
be present, just as it is in any ordinary fixed exchange rate regime. The difference 
with monetary union is that it raised the stakes by cementing all financial claims into 
a ‘foreign’ currency.  
 
The Greek government knows this. Indeed, the fear of being deprived of Emergency 
Liquidity Assistance and forced out of the euro140 was the main reason why it 
accepted the conditions attached to the latest bailout. Likewise, it was the threat to cut 
ELA that persuaded the Irish government to accept an official loan programme in 
November 2010 and the Cypriot government to accept a programme in March 2013. 
 
 
In June 2017, Greece received another loan of €8.5bn from the Eurozone’s 19 member states, 
bringing the total value of EU/IMF loans outstanding to €225bn.141 But it was told, it would 
have to wait until 2018 before any debt relief would be considered. Greece is already running 
a primary surplus – the government’s budget balance before debt repayments and interest – of 
between 2-3% of GDP as a result of huge cuts in government spending.  According to Yanis 
Varoufakis, Germany used its political and financial muscle to impose austerity on Greece, 
                                                 
138 European Central Bank (2013), Target Balances and Monetary Operations, Monthly Bulletin, Issue 5, May, 
pp. 103-114. 
139 John Whittaker (2016) Eurosystem Debts do Matter, Lancaster University Management School, 1 February. 
See also John Whittaker and Bernard Connolly (2003) What Will Happen to the Euro, Economic Affairs, 23(1): 
66-71. 
140 A country is forced out of a currency union when it is denied credit and liquidity by other members – 
equivalent in the case of the euro of being thrown out of Target2. By contrast, a country is forced out of a fixed 
exchange rate regime when it runs out of the foreign exchange reserves needed to support the exchange rate at 
the fixed level. 
141 Hellenic Republic Public Debt Bulletin, June 2017. 
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despite widespread acknowledgement in the rest of the Eurozone that the policy was self-
defeating and unsustainable.142   
 
John Whittaker (2016) continues:143 
 
Even if the Greek government runs large budget surpluses which it uses to repay its 
official loans, this will merely cause an equal rise in its Eurosystem (Target2) debt, 
unless the budget surpluses induce private financial inflows.144  
 
While ‘austerity’ may be given the credit for turning round the Irish economy, the 
loan programmes for Greece have been notably unsuccessful and there has been 
mixed success elsewhere. The argument has been made [e.g., by Varoufakis] that 
austerity in Greece may have improved economic efficiency and budget balances, but 
that the dominant effect has been to depress economic activity and create political 
instability, making the repayment of loans less likely. 
 
By the beginning of 2017, even Mario Draghi, the Italian head of the ECB – who 4 years 
earlier had said the ECB would do ‘whatever it takes to preserve the euro’ – conceded, in a 
letter to two Italian parliamentarians, that a country could leave the Eurozone, but would first 
need to settle its Target2 liabilities ‘in full’.145 For example, if Italy left the Eurozone, Italian 
citizens would have to repay the equivalent of €433bn.  As equations (2) and (3) show, this 
could only be achieved by inducing sufficient private financial inflows, e.g., through the sale 
of national assets, such as state industries and Banca d’Italia’s gold holdings.  
 
The problem in the case of Greece, as Tim Worstall points out, is that: 
 
Greece cannot afford the primary surplus the Eurogroup146 has called for… 
 
Debts which cannot be repaid will not be repaid. That’s why we have bankruptcy in 
the first place. Or, when it comes to sovereign nations, we have debt rescheduling and 
IMF programmes instead of bankruptcy. 
When the Greek crisis first blew up, what should have happened was the standard 
IMF programme: a haircut on the debt, devalue the currency and a bit of a loan to 
tide things over until growth returned. This is similar to the approach taken by 
Iceland – which has already recovered while Greece languishes – and is what the 
IMF has been doing for decades in other places. 
                                                 
142 Yanis Varoufakis (2017) Adults in the Room: My Battle with Europe's Deep Establishment, Bodley Head, 
London. 
143 John Whittaker (2016) Eurosystem Debts do Matter, Lancaster University Management School, 1 February. 
144 See equations (2) and (3) above. 
145 Any country leaving euro zone must settle bill first: ECB's Draghi, Reuters, 20 January 2017; 
http://uk.reuters.com/article/us-ecb-eurozone-idUKKBN1542KL 
146 The group of Eurozone finance ministers. 
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The one thing standing between Greece and this approach was the euro. In order to 
protect the integrity of the single currency, debts to the private sector banks were 
refinanced by public money from varying combinations of the EU itself, the ECB, the 
Eurogroup, the IMF and so on. 
This is the crucial point. There are no private sector capitalists left. If there were, we 
could simply say “you lost your money, better luck next time”. Instead there are only 
official creditors, run by politicians, who have their voters wondering what has 
happened or will happen to their money. 
For it is still true that Greece cannot repay those debts, and therefore Greece will not 
repay them. All that can change is who will lose money and when. Unsurprisingly, 
politicians are keen to delay the inevitable until they have retired and are collecting 
their pensions. That the Greeks have to see theirs cut in the interim is just bad luck. 
…The Greek debt crisis is a contest between politics and reality.147 
 
Should Greece leave the euro and the Bank of Greece failed to pay back its Eurosystem debt 
in full, the NCBs of the other Eurozone countries would share the loss in proportion to their 
capital key.  
Is there a political solution to the Eurozone problem? 
 
Supporters of the euro believe that the Eurozone will in due course become an OCA if there 
is also ‘closer economic policy coordination with an agreed framework for national budgetary 
policies’.148 In effect, this means fiscal and political union of the member states of the 
Eurozone. A number of European and UK economists have also recognised this: 
 
• ‘There can be little doubt that the absence of a political union is a serious design flaw 
in the European monetary union that will have to be remedied to guarantee the long-
run survival of the Eurozone’.149 
• ‘European integration is a political process. The importance of the political origins, 
motivations and consequences of European integration cannot be overemphasised’.150 
• ‘The EMU seems locked into a vicious circle, which had been foreseen long ago: 
“monetary unity imposed under unfavourable conditions will prove a barrier to the 
                                                 
147 Tim Worstall (2017) Greece can never pay its debts. So why not admit it?, CAPX, 2 May; https://capx.co/yet-
another-eurofudge-will-prolong-greeces-suffering/?omhide=true 
148 ‘Optimal Currency Area Revisited’, Pierre Werner Lecture by Yves Mersch, Governor of the Central Bank of 
Luxembourg, at the European Institute, Florence, 26 October 2011. 
149 Paul De Grauwe (2006) Flaws in the Design of the Eurosystem?, International Finance, 9, 137-144. 
150 Francesco Paolo Mongelli (2008) European Economic and Monetary Integration, and the Optimum 
Currency Area Theory, Economic Papers 302, Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, 
European Commission.  
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achievement of political unity”, Milton Friedman foresaw. But now political unity is 
precisely the necessary condition to save monetary unity’.151 
• ‘EMU is impractical to the point of impossibility if…it is introduced before – rather 
in conjunction with – political union. In this context, political union must include a 
thorough-going centralisation of fiscal and debt management powers. There is no 
escape from the interdependence of political and monetary union. German politicians 
and Bundesbank officials have correctly emphasised that the two ideas are 
inseparable. Indeed, for many of Europe's leaders, the great merit of EMU is that it is 
a building-block – perhaps the most important building-block – in the construction of 
political union. In view of the proliferation of official statements associating political 
and monetary union, Mr. Kenneth Clarke's view that “I do not believe EMU is any 
threat to the continued existence of the nation state” is puzzling. At any rate, the EU 
will fail to create a single currency unless it simultaneously establishes a political 
union’.152 
 
However, the EU is a very long way from political unification and there is a clear and present 
crisis with the Eurozone which Target2 (like other rescue attempts) is merely papering over.  
 
Yet, there is a completely different view of the Eurozone crisis – and it is held by the EU’s 
political establishment. Far from being concerned, a crisis is exactly what they wanted.  This 
is because a crisis – indeed a series of crises – is the only way to get political union in Europe 
– which is their ultimate aim. The foundation stone of this strategy was laid down by Jean 
Monnet, one of the founding fathers of the European Union.  Understandably enough, after 
the horrors of two world wars, he – along with other post-war leaders, such as Konrad 
Adenauer and Robert Schuman – prized peace above all other virtues and no price was too 
high to pay for it. To prevent further wars on European soil, the resources for making war – 
coal and steel – needed to be shared amongst the European people, not concentrated in the 
hands of a single European power. And so he came up with a proposal to introduce a 
European Coal and Steel Community – a ‘proposal [that] will lay the first concrete 
foundations of the European Federation which is indispensable for the maintenance of peace’. 
Set up in 1951, this was the first of the organisations that ultimately developed into the 
European Union.   
 
But Monnet – who never stood for or was elected to political office – also recognised that the 
creation of a European Union was not going to be a straightforward process: ‘I have always 
believed that Europe would be built through crises, and that it would be the sum of their 
solutions. But the solutions had to be proposed and applied’.153 He believed that economic 
crises should be welcomed as opportunities to bring the states of Europe closer together, give 
                                                 
151 Paolo Pasimeni (2014) An Optimum Currency Crisis, European Journal of Comparative Economics, 11, 
173-204. 
152 Tim Congdon (1997)  Why the Euro Will Fail. In Paul Temperton (ed., 1997) The Euro, John Wiley & 
Sons, Chichester, 77-95. 
153 Quoted in John Lanchester (2016) The Failure of the Euro, CAPX, 24 October; http://capx.co/external/the-
failure-of-the-euro/ 
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up sovereignty and gradually move to a federal Europe. He wrote to a friend in 1952: 
‘Europe's nations should be guided towards the super-state without their people 
understanding what is happening. This can be accomplished by successive steps, each 
disguised as having an economic purpose, but which will eventually and irreversibly lead to 
federation’. 
The introduction of the single currency in 1999 was just another step towards federation.  But 
there was a fundamental economic problem with the way it was implemented as pointed out 
by John Lanchester: ‘The nineteen countries in the Eurozone (out of twenty-eight in the EU) 
would adopt a single currency but would not have a parallel system to raise tax. There would 
be monetary union without fiscal union. A European Central Bank would run the currency 
and set interest rates, but there would be no pan-European finance ministry to run the 
economy. If you pitched this idea to a class in Economics 101, there would be an 
embarrassed pause, and eventually a hand would go up and someone would ask, “Is that even 
possible?” The answer: “Nobody knows.” The EU went ahead with its experiment anyway. 
To raise the stakes even further,… monetary union was, by design, irreversible’.154  
While this looks like a serious flaw in the design of the euro – which soon became apparent 
in the boom and bust experience of the Eurozone’s peripheral economies in the first decade 
following the euro’s introduction – Europe’s political elite see it as another step in the 
process first to fiscal union and then to political union. It is no accident that the 1957 Treaty 
of Rome – the first formal treaty setting up what is now the European Union – opens with the 
aim of pursuing ‘ever closer union’ or that modern successors to Monnet, such as Guy 
Verhofstadt MEP – chair of the European Parliament’s Brexit Steering Group and a former prime 
minister of Belgium – openly call for a United States of Europe. He believes that political 
unity is now Europe’s ‘last chance’ and wants her to ‘abandon the artificial divisions of 
nation-states and instead embrace a unified democracy on a continental scale, a United States 
of Europe, …so that Europe remains secure, influential, and prosperous into the future’.155 
This view is strongly supported by Martin Schulz, then leader of the German Social 
Democratic Party, who wants a United States of Europe by 2025.156  
 
But there’s the rub – what form should this political unity take? There are only two possible 
models that Europe could adopt, those of France or Germany, as a recent book by German, 
British and French economists Markus K. Brunnermeier, Harold James, and Jean-Pierre 
Landau (2016) makes clear.157 The authors: 
                                                 
154 John Lanchester (2016) The Failure of the Euro, CAPX, 24 October; http://capx.co/external/the-failure-of-
the-euro/ 
155 Guy Verhofstadt (2017) Europe's Last Chance: Why the European States Must Form a More Perfect Union, 
Basic Books.  See also Guy Verhofstadt (2006) The United States of Europe, Federal Trust.  At a speech at the 
London School of Economics on 28 September 2017, Mr Verhofstadt went further and called for the EU to turn 
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156 Philip Oltermann (2017) Martin Schulz wants 'United States of Europe' within eight years, Guardian, 7 
December.  
157 Markus K. Brunnermeier, Harold James, and Jean-Pierre Landau (2016) The Euro and the Battle of Ideas, 
Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ. 
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…explore the dichotomy between French and German political-economic 
philosophies. The first values flexibility and solidarity and state intervention; the 
second stresses rules and consequences and free markets. 
They note that France and Germany have in effect swapped sides in this debate. In the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the French had a strong tradition of 
economic liberalism, and the newly unified Germany believed in state-centered, state-
directed economic policies. These biases were reversed by the disasters of Nazism 
and the Second World War. France’s wartime failure discredited its elites and their 
laissez-faire inclinations, and led to a heavy new emphasis on state planning, whereas 
Germany became obsessed with the idea of a rules-based liberalism. The product, 
known as Ordoliberalism, involves a mixture of free-market economics with an 
attitude toward rules that approaches mystic reverence.158 
…It is a matter of deep conviction [in Germany] that the euro must never be a 
“transfer union”. The Eurozone must never be about the rich paying for the poor, the 
North for the South. There are good historical reasons for this passionate adherence 
to fiscal rectitude, rooted in the causal link between deficits, runaway inflation, and 
the rise of the Nazis…. This theme in German thought runs very deep. A German 
government can’t follow the necessary policies without facing electoral disaster…. 
Where others see a crisis caused by weak demand, Germany sees a crisis caused by 
excessive use of cheap credit, which can be cured only by severe cuts in spending. 
…Chancellor Angela Merkel…talks fondly about the “Swabian housewife”, a figure 
of legendary common sense and frugality who, when times are hard, balances the 
books by cutting her spending.159  
Which country’s version of political union will be end up being victorious?  At their first 
meeting on the day after his election in May 2017, Emmanuel Macron and Angela Merkel 
‘struck a consensual tone’ when they agreed to draw up a roadmap of ‘ambitious reforms’ to 
                                                 
158 Ordoliberalism is the German variant of social liberalism that emphasises the role of the state in ensuring that 
the free market produces results close to its theoretical potential and so helps to prevent powerful private 
interests – particularly from abroad – from undermining competition. It relies heavily on rules and independent 
institutions, such as an independent central bank, to achieve these outcomes. It also results in Germany being 
strongly protectionist about its domestic economy. As Juliet Samuel points out: ‘Germany has consistently 
shown that it has a wide definition of strategic economic assets and it will support action to protect them. The 
high structural barriers to hostile takeovers and the continued dominance of family ownership are also signs of a 
society ill at ease with the whims of footloose global capital…. Moreover, despite its rhetoric about free 
movement and European solidarity, Germany assiduously protects its population from intense labour market 
competition. All sorts of jobs, from plumbing to construction, are protected by the need to take long, rigorous, 
German-language vocational courses’. The protectionism can extend to collusion in key industries: Spielgel has 
recently reported that Daimler, BMW, Volkswagen, Porsche and Audi have operated a secret technology cartel 
for the past 20 years in which they collude on what technology they offer their customers; in October 2017, 
BMW’s Munich headquarters was raided for evidence; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ordoliberalism, 
https://mainlymacro.blogspot.fr/2014/01/ordoliberalism-neoliberalism-and.html, Juliet Samuel (2017) Berlin 
reveals true colours…, Daily Telegraph, 14 July, Justin Huggler (2017) German carmakers’ ‘cartel’, Daily 
Telegraph, 22 July, and Alan Tovey (2017) Anti-trust watchdog searches BMW’s HQ, Daily Telegraph, 21 
October. 
159 Review by John Lanchester (2016) The Failure of the Euro, CAPX, 24 October; http://capx.co/external/the-
failure-of-the-euro.  
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EU treaties that will ‘deepen the existing European Union and especially the Eurozone’. 
France has previously resisted treaty changes and Wolfgang Schäuble, the former German 
Finance Minister, has said that Macron's idea of creating a budget and finance minister for the 
Eurozone was unrealistic because it would require changes to EU treaties. Macron now says 
French attitudes have changed: ‘In the past, the subject of treaty change was a French taboo. 
It will no longer be the case’. In March 2018, Christine Lagarde, head of the IMF and former 
French Finance Minister, backed Macron’s call for greater fiscal and banking union among 
Eurozone member states in order to support a more economically integrated currency 
union.160 
Nevertheless, beneath the surface lie underlying tensions in the Franco-German relationship 
because Macron is also asking Germany behind the scenes ‘to pay for struggling states that 
resist reforms’, although he wanted to reassure the Germans that the Eurozone will not 
‘develop into a “transfer union” in which Germany is asked to bankroll other states’. He also 
said he did not support the idea of Eurobonds, which would allow Eurozone members to issue 
debt jointly, with weaker members benefiting from lower risk premiums thanks to Germany's 
creditworthiness: ‘I have never defended (the idea of) Eurobonds or the mutualisation of 
existing debt in the Eurozone’.161  
Germany has been able to build up huge trade surpluses both within the Eurozone and 
internationally by benefiting from a lower euro exchange rate than the Deutsche Mark would 
have been had there been no currency union.162 And Wolfgang Schäuble has made it very 
clear that ‘Germany has no plans to reduce its export surplus’. Indeed, the opposite is 
happening: the ECB’s quantitative easing programme has led to a weaker euro and a 
corresponding increase in Germany’s trade surplus to almost €300bn, which now exceeds 
China as the world’s largest.163 
The problem is that all this comes at very high cost to the rest of the people of Europe – both 
economically and politically.  
At the economic level, the combination of a single currency, persistent regional trade 
imbalances, but no system of fiscal transfers – in the absence of the other OCA criteria 
holding – is not sustainable.164 Yet there is no sign of flexibility from Germany. The ECB’s 
                                                 
160 Anna Isaac (2018) IMF boss backs French calls for closer integration in the Eurozone, Daily Telegraph, 27 
March. 
161 Reported in Paul Carrel and Michel (2017) Merkel and Macron agree to draw up roadmap to deeper EU 
integration, Reuters, 15 May 2017; http://in.reuters.com/article/germany-france-leaders-roadmap-
idINKCN18B28T 
162 Similar behaviour by China to keep its currency artificially low against the dollar – in order to build up a 
huge trade surplus vis-à-vis the US – is known as currency manipulation in the US. 
163 Germany's Schäuble blames ECB for German export surplus, Reuters, 9 September 2016; 
http://www.reuters.com/article/germany-exports-idUSL8N1BL1GE 
164 This is now widely recognised, even in Germany, as recent press articles show. See, e.g., Jeremy Warner 
(2017) Fault lines at the heart of Europe can’t be closed: London may be happy to bankroll the North – but 
Germany won’t pick up the bills for Greece, Daily Telegraph, 26 May; Roger Bootle (2017) Trump is correct – 
German surplus is bad news for everybody, Daily Telegraph, 4 June; and David Nonhoff (2017) Germany’s 
trade surplus is a threat to the EU, CAPX, 12 June. Nonhoff is a research assistant at the German Bundestag.  
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Draghi continually asks Schäuble to reduce his trade surplus, but his reply is always ‘I 
haven’t heard that the ECB is changing its monetary policy’.165  It is only the unofficial 
redistributions via Target2 that is keeping the euro afloat. This is Draghi’s bitter-sweet 
revenge on Schäuble, since most of the redistributions go to Italy. 
At the political level, the European political establishment might well believe that the 
political gains to themselves of greater integration exceed the economic costs – as Feldstein 
conjectured166 – but there is a huge political cost to engineered crises167 and games of 
‘destructive creationism’, and that is the loss of democracy. There is no evidence that the 
people of Europe want to be in a United States of Europe and certainly one that is in reality as 
anti-democratic as the EU.  While, there is supposed to be ‘double democracy’ in the EU – 
represented by the European Council and the European Parliament – the reality is that the EU 
is run by the bureaucrats of the European Commission who run rings around ministers from 
national governments.168  
 
These bureaucrats are indeed openly contemptuous of the democratic wishes of the European 
people, as the current president of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker takes 
every opportunity to make clear: 
 
• ‘I'm ready to be insulted as being insufficiently democratic’ 
• ‘If it's a Yes, we will say “on we go”, and if it's a No we will say “we continue”’ (on 
the 2005 French referendum on the EU constitution) 
• ‘We decide on something, leave it lying around and wait and see what happens. If no 
one kicks up a fuss, because most people don’t understand what has been decided, we 
continue step by step until there is no turning back’. 
• ‘Of course there will be transfers of sovereignty. But would I be intelligent to draw 
the attention of public opinion to this fact?’ (on British calls for a referendum over the 
Lisbon Treaty). 
• ‘There can be no democratic choice against the European Treaties’ (in ‘Greece: The 
dangerous game’, Le Figaro, 1 February 2015).169 
 
Supporters of the euro who believe that the Eurozone can genuinely become an OCA cannot 
now escape from the recognition that this can only happen if there is full fiscal and political 
union. The first stage in this process began in August 2017, when Angela Merkel agreed to 
                                                 
165 Germany's Schäuble blames ECB for German export surplus, Reuters, 9 September 2016; 
http://www.reuters.com/article/germany-exports-idUSL8N1BL1GE 
166 Martin Feldstein (1992) Europe’s Monetary Union: The case against EMU, The Economist, 13 June.  
167 If a crisis is predictable, then it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the crisis was engineered, unless those 
that sowed the seeds of the crisis were completely incompetent – as was the case in the GFC. 
168 This was well illustrated in an interview with former UK government minister Kenneth Baker conducted by 
Peter Hennessy on BBC Radio 4’s Reflections programme on 23 August 2016.  Lord Baker reported that it is 
common for European Commission civil servants to come up with proposals which were rejected by ministers 
from national governments only to come back with a virtually identical set of proposals a few months later when 
these ministers have moved on to other responsibilities; http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b07pgvjg 
169 Jean-Claude Juncker's most outrageous political quotations, Daily Telegraph, 15 July 2014; Marian L Tupy 
(2017) Why sovereignty matters, CAPX, 3 August. 
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support Emmanuel Macron’s proposals for a Eurozone budget of €300-400bn a year and a 
Brussels-based finance minister for the Eurozone, despite Schäuble’s previous downplaying 
of the idea.170 Macron has also made clear that he expects further significant moves towards 
completing the political infrastructure of economic and monetary union.171 In his ‘state of the 
union’ address to the European parliament in September 2017, Mr Juncker used Brexit as an 
opportunity to call for further steps towards political union with a single president – 
combining the presidencies of the European Commission and the European Council.172 He 
also called for all member states to adopt the euro, to have qualified majority voting, rather 
than unanimity, on foreign policy matters, and to have a single European army by 2025.173 
 
Yet it is hard to see how a political union engineered along the lined proposed by Monnet, 
Juncker and Verhofstadt will be very democratic and therefore how it will be sustainable in 
the long run.  
Why is the problem with Target2 so little known? 
This is a question I am struggling to answer. It is clearly well known within the treasuries and 
central banks of Europe and amongst banking academics174 and the odd lawyer.175 But 
outside this small coterie, how many people have even heard of Target2?  
 
Some journalists have obviously written about problems in the Eurozone, but very few have 
done this in the context of Target2. A notable exception is the pseudonymous ‘Tyler Durden’ 
who has been writing about Target2 since 2012 on the Zerohedge website.176 Just a 
                                                 
170 Guy Chazan (2017) Merkel backs Macron’s vision for eurozone reform: German chancellor endorses 
proposal for single currency area finance minister, Financial Times, 29 August. 
171 David Marsh (2017) Problems beyond Merkel Victory, OMFIF, 5 September; 
https://www.omfif.org/analysis/commentary/2017/september/problems-beyond-merkel-
victory/?utm_source=omfifweeklyupdate; Angela Merkel’s reliance in the Free Democrat Party after the 
German general election on 24 September 2017 is likely to slow down the move to fiscal union. Its leader, 
Christian Lindner said his party would not tolerate any drift towards a fiscal transfer union, and demanded that 
holders of Eurozone sovereign debt should suffer sobering losses before there can any further rescues for 
governments in trouble (reported in Ambrose Evans-Pritchard (2017) German court threatens QE as plans die 
for euro fiscal union, Daily Telegraph, 17 October). 
172 ‘Europe would be easier to understand if one captain was steering the ship’. 
173 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-17-3165_en.htm 
174 Such as: Hans-Werner Sinn; Karl Whelan of University College Dublin who presented ‘Target2 and the Euro 
Crisis’ at the Bank of England on 26 June 2012 (http://www.karlwhelan.com/Presentations/Whelan-BoE.pdf) 
and who wrote ‘All You Wanted to Know About TARGET2 But Were Afraid to Ask’ 
(https://www.forbes.com/sites/karlwhelan/2012/11/19/all-you-wanted-to-know-about-target2-but-were-afraid-
to-ask/#31a00c5a4605, 19 November 2012) and  ‘TARGET2 and Central Bank Balance Sheets’ (UCD 
Discussion Paper, 21 November 2012); and  Frank Westermann and Sven Steinkamp who run the Euro Crisis 
Monitor at the Institute of Empirical Economic Research of Osnabrück University. 
175 For example, German lawyer Gunnar Beck is fully aware that: ‘under the so-called Target 2 payments system 
operated by the ECB, Germany’s balance-of-payments surplus with the eurozone is financed not by the transfer 
of foreign-currency reserves, gold or other near-liquid assets, but by an open-ended overdraft facility granted by 
the Bundesbank. Under this peculiar system, the exporter is paid not by the importing country but by Germany’s 
central bank, which itself never receives payment. Rather, a credit note is issued by the importing country’s 
central bank, which it has no obligation ever to pay’ (Gunnar Beck (2016) Germany Discovers some home 
truths about Brexit, Wall Street Journal, 14 September). 
176 For example: 
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sprinkling of UK national newspaper journalists have written the odd article about Target2, 
examples being Izabella Kaminska at the Financial Times177 and Liam Halligan and Ambrose 
Evans-Pritchard both at the Daily Telegraph.  
 
Halligan as far back as 2012 wrote: 178 
How much longer will Germany’s hard-working, inflation-averse population tolerate 
paying for other countries’ excesses? There is considerable anger across the 
Eurozone’s largest economy, even though most voters don’t know the half of it. 
Obscure data shows that under so-called Target2 operations, the ECB’s intra-
eurozone payments system, the Bundesbank is owed a mighty €620bn by other 
member states. This stealth bail-out dwarfs German’s covert contributions to previous 
Eurozone rescues, which themselves provoked bitter public criticism.  
More recently, Evans-Pritchard wrote:179 
                                                                                                                                                        
• Tyler Durden (2012) Is TARGET2 A Less Than Thinly Veiled Bailout For Europe's Periphery?, 
Zerohedge, 19 June; http://www.zerohedge.com/news/guest-post-target2-less-thinly-veiled-bailout-
europes-periphery 
• Tyler Durden (2016) The TARGET2 Chart Shows A Breakdown Of The Central Bank Narrative, 
Zerohedge, 30 June; http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2016-06-30/target2-chart-shows-breakdown-
central-bank-narrative 
• Tyler Durden (2016) Italy Funding Panic? Target2 Liabilities Unexpectedly Soar To Record High, 
Zerohedge, 7 September; http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2016-09-07/italy-funding-panic-target2-
liabilities-unexpectedly-soar-record-high 
• Tyler Durden (2016) TARGET2 Shows Europe's Banking Crisis Is Escalating Again (Fast), 
Zerohedge, 4 October; http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2016-10-03/target2-shows-europes-banking-
crisis-escalating-again-fast 
• Tyler Durden (2016) Why Europe Must End In Tears, Zerohedge, 10 December; 
http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2016-12-10/why-europe-must-end-tears 
• Tyler Durden (2017) In Stunning Admission, Draghi Says A Country Can Leave Eurozone But Must 
"Settle Bill First", Zerohedge, 21 January; http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2017-01-21/stunning-
admission-draghi-says-country-can-leave-eurozone-must-settle-its-bill-first?page=1 
• Tyler Durden (2017) The European Debt Bomb Fuse Is Lit! Target2 Imbalances Hit Crisis Levels, 
Zerohedge, 26 February; http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2017-02-26/european-debt-bomb-fuse-lit-
target2-imbalances-hit-crisis-levels 
• Tyler Durden (2017) BIS Admits TARGET2 Is A Stealth Bailout Of Europe's Periphery, Zerohedge, 6 
March; http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2017-03-06/bis-admits-target2-stealth-bailout-europes-
periphery 
• Tyler Durden (2017) Eurozone Capital Flight Intensifies- Target2 Imbalances Widen Again, 
Zerohedge, 6 March; http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2017-03-06/eurozone-capital-flight-intensifies-
target2-imbalances-widen-again 
• Tyler Durden (2017) Target2 & Secret Bailouts: Will Germany Be Forced Into Fiscal Union With Rest 
Of Eurozone?, Zerohedge, 24 April; http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2017-04-23/target2-secret-
bailouts-will-germany-be-forced-fiscal-union-rest-eurozone 
• Tyler Durden (2017) The ECB's Target2 Lies - Exposing The Real Capital Flight From Italy & Spain, 
Zerohedge, 25 September; http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2017-09-24/ecbs-target2-lies-exposing-
real-capital-flight-italy-spain  
177 Izabella Kaminska (2017) So turns out Target2 imbalances in 2012 WERE a big deal, Financial Times, 6 
March 2017. 
178 Liam Halligan (2012) IMF allows Eurozone to stay in its fantasy world, Daily Telegraph, 21 April. Liam 
Halligan and Gerard Lyons also cover Target2 in their book Clean Brexit: Why Leaving the EU Still Makes 
Sense – Building a Post-Brexit Economy for All (Biteback Publishing, 2017). 
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Vast liabilities are being switched quietly from private banks and investment funds 
onto the shoulders of taxpayers across southern Europe. It is a variant of the 
tragic episode in Greece, but this time on a far larger scale, and with systemic global 
implications. 
There has been no democratic decision by any parliament to take on these fiscal 
debts, rapidly approaching €1 trillion. They are the unintended side-effect of 
quantitative easing by the European Central Bank, which has degenerated into a 
conduit for capital flight from the Club Med bloc to Germany, Luxembourg, and The 
Netherlands. 
This 'socialisation of risk' is happening by stealth, a mechanical effect of the ECB's 
Target2 payments system. If a political upset in France or Italy triggers an existential 
euro crisis over coming months, citizens from both the Eurozone's debtor and creditor 
countries will discover to their horror what has been done to them. 
…"Alarm bells are starting to ring again. Our flow data is picking up serious capital 
flight into German safe-haven assets. It feels like the build-up to the Eurozone crisis 
in 2011," said Simon Derrick from BNY Mellon. 
The Target2 system is designed to adjust accounts automatically between the 
branches of the ECB's family of central banks, self-correcting with each ebbs and 
flow. In reality it has become a cloak for chronic one-way capital outflows. 
Private investors sell their holdings of Italian or Portuguese sovereign debt to the 
ECB at a profit, and rotate the proceeds into mutual funds in Germany or 
Luxembourg. "What it basically shows is that monetary union is slowly disintegrating 
despite the best efforts of Mario Draghi," said a former ECB governor. 
The Banca d'Italia alone now owes a record €364bn to the ECB180 – 22pc of GDP –
 and the figure keeps rising. Mediobanca estimates that €220bn has left Italy since the 
ECB first launched QE. The outflows match the pace of ECB bond purchases almost 
euro for euro [as Figure 16 makes clear]. 
Professor Marcello Minenna from Milan's Bocconi University said the implicit shift 
in private risk to the public sector – largely unreported in the Italian media – exposes 
the Italian central bank to insolvency if the euro breaks up or if Italy is forced out of 
monetary union. "Frankly, these sums are becoming unpayable," he said. 
The ECB argued for years that these Target2 imbalances were an accounting fiction 
that did not matter in a monetary union. Not any longer.  Mario Draghi wrote a letter 
                                                                                                                                                        
179 Ambrose Evans-Pritchard (2017) Unpayable debts and an existential EU financial crisis – are Eurozone 
central banks still solvent?, Daily Telegraph, 23 February 2017. 
180 As of December 2016. 
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to Italian Euro-MPs in January warning them that the debts would have to be "settled 
in full" if Italy left the euro and restored the lira. 
This is a potent statement. Mr Draghi has written in black and white confirming that 
Target2 liabilities are deadly serious – as critics said all along – and revealed in a 
sense that Italy's public debt is significantly higher than officially declared. The 
Banca d'Italia has offsetting assets but these would be heavily devalued. 
Spain's Target2 liabilities are €328bn, almost 30pc of GDP.  Portugal and Greece 
are both at €72bn. All are either insolvent or dangerously close if these debts are 
crystallised. 
Willem Buiter from Citigroup says central banks within the unfinished structure of the 
Eurozone are not really central banks at all. They are more like currency boards. 
They can go bust, and several are likely to do so. In short, they are "not a credible 
counterparty" for the rest of the Eurosystem. 
It is astonishing that the rating agencies still refuse to treat the contingent liabilities 
of Target2 as real debts even after the Draghi letter, and given the self-evident 
political risk.  Perhaps they cannot do so since they are regulated by the EU 
authorities and are from time to time subjected to judicial harassment in countries 
that do not like their verdicts. Whatever the cause of such forbearance, it may come 
back to haunt them. 
On the other side of the ledger, the German Bundesbank has built up Target2 credits 
of €796bn. Luxembourg has credits of €187bn, reflecting its role as a financial hub. 
This is roughly 350pc of the tiny Duchy's GDP, and fourteen times the annual budget. 
So what happens if the euro fractures? We can assume that there would be a tidal 
wave of capital flows long before that moment arrived, pushing the Target2 
imbalances towards €1.5 trillion. Mr Buiter says the ECB would have to cut off 
funding lines to "irreparably insolvent" central banks in order to protect itself. 
The chain-reaction would begin with a southern default to the ECB, which in turn 
would struggle to meet its Target2 obligations to the northern bloc, if it was still a 
functioning institution at that point. The ECB has no sovereign entity standing behind 
it. It is an orphan. 
The central banks of Germany, Holland, and Luxembourg would lose some of their 
Target2 credits, yet they would have offsetting liabilities under enforceable legal 
contracts to banks operating in their financial centres. These liabilities occur because 
that is how the creditor central banks sterilise Target2 inflows. 
In other words, the central bank of Luxembourg would suddenly owe 350pc of GDP 
to private counter-parties, entailing debt issued under various legal terms and mostly 
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denominated in euros. They could try printing Luxembourgish francs and see how 
that works. 
Moody's, Standard & Poor's, and Fitch all rate Luxembourg a rock-solid AAA 
sovereign credit, of course, but that only demonstrates the pitfalls of intellectual and 
ideological capture.    
It did not matter that the EMU edifice is built on sand as long as the project retained 
its aura of inevitability. It matters now.  
…Whether Italy can survive the loss of the ECB shield is an open question. 
Mediobanca says the Italian treasury must raise or roll over €200bn a year, and 
Frankfurt is essentially the only buyer. 
Greece could be cowed into submission when it faced crisis. The country is small and 
psychologically vulnerable on the Balkan fringes, cheek by jowl with Turkey. The 
sums of money were too small to matter much in any case. 
It is France and Italy that threaten to subject the euro experiment to its ordeal by fire. 
If the system breaks, the Target2 liabilities will become all too real and it will not stop 
there. Trillions of debt contracts will be called into question. 
This is a greater threat to the City of London and the banking nexus of the Square 
Mile than the secondary matter of euro clearing, or any of the largely manageable 
headaches stemming from Brexit.  
Implications for the UK 
Although the UK does not contribute to the European Stability Mechanism, it is clearly not 
immune from what is happening in Target2 and the Eurozone.  
 
This is principally because of the UK government’s contribution to the programmes set up to 
resolve the Eurozone banking and sovereign debt crises:181 
• It helped to bail out the Irish banking system as part of a €85bn rescue package 
involving the ECB and IMF which began in 2010.182 The UK’s contribution was 
£7bn. Included in this was a series of bilateral interest-bearing loans to the Irish 
government totalling £3.2bn that were made between 2010 and 2013 and which 
mature between 2019 and 2021.183 There was an additional £10bn to support Dublin-
headquartered Ulster Bank, a subsidiary of Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) which, 
despite its name, operates mainly in the Irish Republic, as part of the £45.80bn rescue 
                                                 
181 What does the eurozone debt crisis mean for the UK?, BBC News, 9 December 2011. 
182 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Financial_Stability_Facility 
183 http://www.thejournal.ie/ireland-interest-repayment-to-britain-1120288-Oct2013; Telegraph View (2013) 
Ireland bail-out: Britain pays the price of the euro’s failure, 22 November. 
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of RBS in 2008.  Similarly, Lloyds Bank transferred £6.41bn of its £20.54bn rescue 
package to its Irish operation, Bank of Scotland (Ireland), before dissolving the 
business. In both cases, the funds were used to write off billions of pounds of loans 
made to Irish commercial property developers and households during the ‘Celtic 
Tiger’ boom years.184 
• It contributed €3.6bn to help bail out the Portuguese banking system as part of the 
€78bn ECB-IMF rescue package in 2011.185 
• It increased its contributions to the IMF, thereby allowing the IMF to provide rescue 
loans to Eurozone states in financial difficulty. Total contributions increased by 
€200bn, of which €150bn came from the various NCBs in the eurozone, with the rest 
coming from other NCBs, including the Bank of England. The Bank of England’s 
share is around 4.5% of the total. The IMF was involved in seven bank bailouts 
between 2010 and 2015 (Ireland, 2010; Greece, 2010, 2012 and 2015; Portugal, 2011; 
Spain, 2012; and Cyprus, 2012) and the total contribution of the UK was around 
€4.5bn.186, 187 
• Where a bailout creates a shortfall in funding for regular projects, it is filled by extra 
contributions from all EU members. The UK would contribute to this extra funding in 
line with its share of regular contributions to the EU Budget. The UK government’s 
EU negotiations in February 2016 – prior to the Referendum – stipulated that the UK 
would be reimbursed for any additional costs to the EU’s general budget created when 
emergency funding was provided to Eurozone states, other than administrative costs. 
Despite this, it is possible for the EU to use the EU Budget directly to grant ad hoc 
financial assistance to a Eurozone state as a result of Article 122 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union which states that: ‘Where a Member State is in 
difficulties or is seriously threatened with severe difficulties caused by natural 
disasters or exceptional occurrences beyond its control, the Council… may grant, 
under certain conditions, Union financial assistance to the Member State 
concerned’.188 
                                                 
184 Philip Aldrick (2013), British taxpayers funded Ireland's £14bn bail-out, Daily Telegraph, 19 January; Sam 
Coates (2013) Irish bailout costs British taxpayers an extra £10bn, The Times, 10 June. 
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Although the Bank of England – as a non-Eurozone NCB – will not be liable to fund any 
losses of the ECB related to the Eurozone,189 the UK banking system is exposed to the 
Eurozone banking system. UK banks have made significant loans to both Irish and French 
banks, and the French banks, in turn, have made substantial loans to Italian and Spanish 
banks. So if any Italian and Spanish banks fail, this could have a negative impact on UK 
banks, not least by restricting their ability to raise finance in euros and other major 
currencies. There would also be problems if a Eurozone-headquartered bank, which did 
significant business in London, got into difficulties. 
UK savers and investors with Eurozone bank accounts or asset holdings could face a haircut. 
Those with bank deposits above €100,000 could be liable for an 8% haircut if the bank 
becomes insolvent.  
UK households could also be affected in terms of savings and mortgage rates. If a Eurozone 
banking crisis affected UK banks, this could raise the interest rate at which UK banks could 
borrow money on the wholesale money markets which would then lead to higher rates on 
new mortgages. On the other hands, the UK might be considered a safe haven for Eurozone 
depositors and investors, and this would help to reduce deposit and mortgage rates in the UK; 
it would also raise property prices, especially in London. 
Finally, the value of the euro affects exporters to, importers from and tourists visiting 
Eurozone countries. Studies have shown that an increase in the likelihood of the Eurozone 
breaking up results in the euro depreciating and its volatility increasing.190 
Conclusion 
The evidence is overwhelming that the Eurozone is not an Optimal Currency Area. The first 
two decades of its existence have shown that a common monetary policy has not stabilised its 
disparate economies. Further, there is insufficient wage flexibility and labour mobility to 
eliminate unemployment quickly and insufficient price flexibility and capital mobility to 
remove intra-Eurozone trade imbalances quickly. Most significantly, the Eurozone has no 
counter-cyclical stabilisation mechanism, e.g., an official system of regional redistributions 
whereby regions with balance of payments surpluses redistribute them via fiscal transfers to 
regions with balance of payments deficits – as happens in other currency unions such as the 
UK and US. 
 
This brings us to Target2 – a simple inter-central bank payments and book-keeping system –  
which has become an unofficial channel for bailing out the euro. As Tyler Durden points out, 
the imbalances in Target2 are ‘a direct result of an unsustainable balance of payment system. 
                                                 
189 https://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/orga/capital/html/index.en.html 
190 See, e.g., Eichler, S. (2012), The Impact of Banking and Sovereign Debt Crisis Risk in the Eurozone on the 
Euro/US Dollar Exchange Rate, Applied Financial Economics, 22, 1215-1232. 
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[They] represent both capital flight and debts that can never be paid back’.191 What is 
remarkable about this is that most people in Europe have never heard of Target2.  Even more 
remarkable is that the whole future of the Eurozone and, indeed, the EU project itself depends 
on what is happening in Target2.   
 
Yet Target2 has helped to create a whole range of moral hazards within the Eurozone, the key 
one being the lowering of credit standards when financially weak banks lend to financially 
weak customers for the purpose of conducting cross-border transactions (such as importing 
goods), as happened in the case of Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena. This is because these 
loans can be converted using Target2 into ‘risk-free’ central bank loans which never have to 
be repaid.192 
In reality, Germany cannot prevent either the recycling of surpluses or the lowering of credit 
standards if it wants to maintain the euro. But the key to how long the euro actually survives 
is Italy – given the significance of its position in both the EU and the Eurozone. As Figure 14 
shows, Italy’s economy is in sharp decline relative to other EU states – its per capital GDP is 
lower today than it was at beginning of the millennium. It has the largest Target2 liabilities. If 
Italy decided to leave the Eurozone, then not only would it be unable to repay these debts – as 
Mario Draghi clearly knows – it would most likely also trigger both the end of the euro and 
the end of the EU project itself. Since Germany’s current political establishment could never 
accept this, it has no real alternative but to keep using Target2 to bail out Italy.193 Ireland and 
Portugal were (relatively) lucky – their financial crises came along early and they were small 
enough to be bailed out in full194 by Germany and the other core countries. Greece was 
unlucky – its crisis came later, by which time Germany had lost patience195 and Greece 
turned out to be expendable, as Yanis Varoufakis makes clear.  
But Italy is a different story – too big to fail, too big to be saved.  Italian banks have around 
€173bn in non-performing loans.196 More than 75% of these are loans to companies and, 
because the banks do not have sufficient capital to absorb the losses, these loans cannot be 
written off.197 Cumbersome corporate restructuring and insolvency procedures, long judicial 
                                                 
191 Tyler Durden (2017) Italy Target2 Imbalance Hits Record €432.5 Billion As Dwindling Trust In Banks 
Plunges, Zerohedge, 7 November; http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2017-11-06/italy-target2-imbalance-hits-
record-%E2%82%AC4325-billion-dwindling-trust-banks-plunges 
192 As Tyler Durden (op cit) points out: ‘If you think Italy can pay German and other creditors a record 
€432.5bn, you are in Fantasyland’. 
193 Paul Lever, a former British ambassador to Germany, confirms Germany’s strong desire to protect the EU at 
all  costs (Paul Lever (2017) Berlin Rules: Europe and the German Way, IB Tauris, London). 
194 Of course, they still took big hits in terms of GDP, wages and unemployment. 
195 As well as not liking the fact that tax evasion is high in Greece, especially amongst the highest paid.  
196 As of December 2016, 
https://www.bancaditalia.it/media/views/2017/npl/index.html?com.dotmarketing.htmlpage.language=1; 114 
Italian banks have non-performing loans that exceed tangible capital (Tyler Durden (2017) 114 Italian Banks 
(Roughly 23%) Have NPLs Exceeding Tangible Assets, Zerohedge, 28 November; 
http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2017-11-28/114-italian-banks-roughly-23-have-npls-exceeding-tangible-
assets). 
197 So the loans are continuously evergreened. 
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processes and tax rules all act to discourage rapid write-offs in Italy.198 If the music does 
eventually stop, it will be Italy that brings down the pack of cards.199 
 
Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz said that in 1992, the European Union made a ‘fatal decision’ 
in choosing ‘to adopt a single currency, without providing for the institutions that would 
make it work… No one had ever tried a monetary union on such a scale, among so many 
countries that were so disparate’.200 Fast forward to 2017 and Tyler Durden claims that ‘Italy 
is on ECB life support. Should Draghi halt QE asset purchases, demand for Italian bonds 
will plunge’; and as if to prove the point, capital flight from Italy (and Spain) to Germany 
increased in the early months of 2017.201 Durden also believes that ‘The EU and the euro 
project have been an economic disaster for all participants, including Germany, which will 
eventually be forced to write off the hard-earned savings she has lent to other Eurozone 
members. We know, with absolute certainty, that the euro will self-destruct and the Eurozone 
will disintegrate’.202 Stiglitz is optimistic enough to believe that a more ‘flexible euro’, such 
as a Northern and Southern euro, can save the euro project.203  
Europe’s political establishment dismiss all this as simply not understanding the real game or 
the degree of patience that is required. The Eurozone crisis is just another crisis on the long 
and irreversible road to fiscal and political union, with Target2 as a convenient device to 
dampen the crisis – just so long as German savers and taxpayers don’t get to hear about it.204 
But this time, they could have taken a leap too far. 
 
To conclude, the answers to the four specific questions asked at the beginning are: 
• No, the Eurozone is not an Optimal Currency Area. This is because it does not satisfy 
the conditions for monetary union. These conditions can only be satisfied if the 
Eurozone adopts fiscal and political union by becoming a federal state.  
• The euro can therefore survive only so long as Germany, in particular, continues – 
albeit reluctantly – to finance the balance of payments deficits of other Eurozone 
members, in particular, Italy and Spain. This requires it both to recycle its trade 
surpluses back to countries with trade deficits and to be the main recipient of capital 
flight from Eurozone states with weak and weakening banking systems.  
                                                 
198 Philip Molyneux (2016) Will Italy’s failing banks trigger financial collapse across Europe?, Guardian, 28 
November. 
199 As Tyler Durden (op cit) also points out: ‘It is no coincidence that Target2 imbalances are on the rise as faith 
in banks collapses. Target2 is a measure of capital flight despite the ECB's assurances’. 
200 Joseph E, Stiglitz (2016) The Euro: How a Common Currency Threatens the Future of Europe, W. W. 
Norton, New York. 
201 Tyler Durden (2017) Eurozone Capital Flight Intensifies - Target2 Imbalances Widen Again, Zerohedge, 6 
March 2017; http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2017-03-06/eurozone-capital-flight-intensifies-target2-
imbalances-widen-again 
202 Tyler Durden (2016) Why Europe Must End In Tears, Zerohedge, 10 December 2016; 
http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2016-12-10/why-europe-must-end-tears 
203 Joseph E, Stiglitz (2016) The Euro: How a Common Currency Threatens the Future of Europe, W. W. 
Norton, New York. 
204 See Roger Bootle (2017) Germany faces an uneasy future as the Eurozone’s magic money tree, Daily 
Telegraph, 12 June. 
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• Target2, the apparently innocuous Eurozone payments system, is critical to 
facilitating the payment flows between surplus and deficit countries. The Target2 
credits of countries such as Germany almost exactly match the balance of payments 
deficits of countries such as Italy and Spain. Since these deficits can never be repaid, 
the euro can only survive if Germany, in particular, agrees to mutualise Eurozone 
debts so that the Eurozone becomes a transfer union. 
• Political union together with a common fiscal as well as monetary policy is the only 
realistic way of saving the euro in the long term and avoid further failed rescue 
packages.205 This is, of course, what Europe’s political establishment wants and has 
been preparing for since the days of Jean Monnet, but it is not obvious that this is 
what the people of Europe want.206 However, given the size of the Target2 
imbalances, it is also conceivable that the Eurozone will not survive and will 
eventually break up; this becomes more likely if political support for the euro project, 
particularly in Germany, begins to wane.207 
 
Target2 is indeed the silent bailout system that keeps the euro afloat – for now.   
                                                 
205 One possible historical model for this is the political union of England and Scotland in 1707. This followed 
the failure of the catastrophic Darien scheme which bankrupted Scotland’s establishment. The English 
government offered to bail out the Kingdom of Scotland in exchange for political union: see,  
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Darien_scheme 
206 Between December 2016 and February 2017, Chatham House surveyed two groups of people across ten EU 
countries: a representative sample of 10,000 members of the public and a sample of over 1,800 of Europe’s 
‘elite’, individuals in positions of influence from politics, the media, business and civil society at local, regional, 
national and European levels. The results reveal a continent split along three lines. First, there is a divide 
between elites and the public. While there is an alignment between the two groups in their attitudes to EU 
solidarity, EU democracy and a sense of European identity, the data show an important divide in general 
attitudes, beliefs and life experiences. The elite are more likely to experience the benefits of EU integration and 
are more liberal and optimistic. Meanwhile, there is ‘simmering discontent’ within the public, large sections of 
whom view the EU in negative terms, want to see it return some powers to member states, and feel anxious over 
the effects of immigration. Only 34% of the public feel they have benefited from the EU, compared with 71% of 
the elite. A majority of the public (54%) think their country was a better place to live 20 years ago (Thomas 
Raines, Matthew Goodwin and David Cutts (2017) The Future of Europe: Comparing Public and Elite 
Attitudes, Chatham House Research Paper, June). 
207 Jacki Davis of the European Policy Centre reports that: ‘It is no exaggeration to say that people in this town 
[Brussels] – who believe passionately in what they have built over the last 60 years – really do believe that the 
whole project is under threat now’ (interviewed by Katya Adler in ‘After Brexit: The Battle for Europe’, BBC2, 
9 February 2017). In the same programme, Ms Adler interviewed Guy Verhofstadt and put it to him that he was 
the only person left in Brussels who still believed in a Unites States of Europe. His reaction was surprisingly 
sheepish. 
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Appendix A – The role of banknotes in Target2208 
Cross-border payments can also be made by drawing banknotes from banks in one Eurozone 
country and depositing them in another, and this is another source of intra-Eurosystem debts. 
Banks in each euro country obtain their banknotes from their NCB and, to account for cross-
border movements, each NCB is allocated a proportion of the total stock of Eurozone-wide 
issue outstanding at any time. If the value of banknotes issued by an NCB exceeds its 
allocation, this excess is recorded as a Eurosystem liability; a NCB that has issued less than 
its allocation has a Eurosystem claim. In addition, these claims and liabilities can be changed 
by the actions of bank customers. To illustrate, if €100 of banknotes is drawn in Greece and 
deposited in Germany, the total issue is unchanged and allocations are therefore unchanged, 
but Greece’s Eurosystem liability rises by €100, while Germany’s claim rises by €100. 
 
An essential property of monetary union is that euro banknotes exchange one-for-one 
irrespective of their country of issue. Since notes are issued by all national central banks in 
the euro area, this means that each NCB must accept notes issued by all others, at par. This 
gives rise to a second essential property: a euro bank deposit in one country has the same 
value as in any other country. To uphold this property, all NCBs must accept claims on all 
others that arise from cross-border financial flows. 
 
Banknotes issued by NCBs are indistinguishable.  While the serial code on each euro 
banknote contains a country letter – e.g., X refers to Germany and T to Ireland – this just 
identifies the NCB that commissioned the printing of the notes, which may or may not be the 
NCB that issued them. This is because notes are distributed around the NCBs between 
printing and issue; also a NCB may reissue notes that it has redeemed and which had 
previously been issued by other NCBs. Notes drawn from a bank in a particular country may 
thus have any letter. 
 
Each NCB is allocated a share of the total euro banknote issue outstanding at any time, 
weighted according to the country’s population and GDP. The weight of each NCB’s 
‘banknote allocation key’ is the same as its ‘capital key’ (which sets the NCB’s contribution 
to the capital of the ECB) multiplied by 92%, the remaining 8% being allocated to the ECB 
as seigniorage. For example, the Bundesbank has a capital key of 23.52% of the Eurozone 
(January 2015) and a banknote allocation key of 24.90%.209  
 
On a NCB balance sheet, the liability ‘banknotes in circulation’ shows this allocated value; it 
is not the value of banknotes issued by that NCB. However, the net outstanding value of 
banknotes issued by a NCB has to be recorded as a liability in its balance sheet. A NCB that 
has issued more notes than its allocation therefore has a further entry on its balance sheet: 
‘liabilities related to the allocation of euro banknotes within the Eurosystem (net)’. When 
                                                 
208 This section draws heavily on: John Whittaker (2011) Eurosystem Debts, Greece, and the Role of Banknotes, 
Lancaster University Management School, 14 November; and John Whittaker (2016) Eurosystem Debts do 
Matter, Lancaster University Management School, 1 February. 
209 Table B1 in Appendix B. 
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added to the NCB’s allocation (the liability labelled ‘banknotes in circulation’), this 
adjustment makes up the total banknote issue of that NCB, and it owes the amount of the 
adjustment to other NCBs. Conversely, where a NCB has issued fewer banknotes than its 
allocation, the difference is entered as an asset: ‘claims related to the allocation of euro 
banknotes’. 
 
This banknote adjustment for each NCB is a claim on, or a liability to, other NCBs in the 
same respect as Target2 claims. Intra-Eurosystem debts arising both from Target2 
transactions and banknote movements bear interest at the main refinancing rate set by the 
ECB. In July 2011 it was 1.5%; since March 2016, it has been 0.0%.210 
 
Table A1: Banknotes issued by central banks 
June 2011  € billions 
 Issued % of GDP Allocated Adjustment 
Austria  -6.8 -2.3 21.6 28.4 
Belgium  9.6 2.6 27.0 17.4 
Cyprus  1.1 6.1 1.5 0.4 
Estonia  0.4 2.4 2.1 1.7 
Finland  10.8 5.7 13.9 3.1 
France  83.9 4.2 158.3 74.4 
Germany  374.0 14.5 210.9 -163.1 
Greece  36.6 16.2 21.9 -14.8 
Ireland  27.1 17.4 12.2 -14.9 
Italy  140.9 8.9 139.2 -1.7 
Luxembourg  69.4 158.4 1.9 -67.4 
Malta  0.8 12.7 0.7 -0.1 
Netherlands  19.9 3.3 44.8 24.9 
Portugal  -0.3 -0.2 19.5 19.8 
Slovakia  6.6 9.4 7.9 1.4 
Slovenia  1.4 3.7 3.7 2.3 
Spain  73.1 6.8 93.4 20.4 
ECB  0.0  67.8 67.8 
Total Eurozone  848.5 9.0 848.5 ------ 
     
US $bn  985.8 6.7   
UK £bn  53.9 3.7   
Note: Negative adjustments indicate issues in excess of allocation. For 
instance, the central bank of Ireland has issued €14.9bn more banknotes than 
its allocation; it therefore owes this amount to other central banks.  
Source: NCB financial statements, IMF International Financial Statistics, 
John Whittaker (2011, Table 1) Eurosystem Debts, Greece, and the Role of 
Banknotes, Lancaster University Management School, 14 November 
 
The values of banknotes issued by Eurozone NCBs at June 2011 are shown in Table A1. 
There are two notable features of these data. First, the actual issues of notes by some NCBs 
differ substantially from their allocations, giving rise to large adjustments, i.e.. intra-
Eurosystem claims. Second, the total banknote issue in the Eurozone as a proportion of GDP 
is markedly larger than in the US or the UK, despite the use of US dollar notes outside the 
US. A likely cause of this large demand for euro notes is the presence of high value notes. Of 
                                                 
210 http://www.euribor-rates.eu/ecb-refinancing-rate.asp 
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the total euro banknote issue, 57% is in €100, €200 and €500 notes (December 2010), 
whereas it is the smaller denominations that are commonly used as a medium of exchange. 
 
Table A2 shows aggregated intra-Eurosystem net claims. The inclusion of credits and debts 
arising from banknote flows can make a significant difference to the overall size of the net 
claims, compared with the Target2 positions alone. If a NCB increases its note issuance 
above its allocation, this reduces its Eurosystem net claim, for a given level of Target2 net 
claims, since the increase in the notes presents an increase in the liabilities of the NCB. 
 
To illustrate, as at June 2011, the German Bundesbank had issued €163.1bn more banknotes 
than its share which, against its €336.5bn Target2 claim, brought its total Eurosystem claim 
down to €173.5bn. Similarly, the NCB of Luxembourg had issued far more notes (€69.4bn) 
than its share (€1.9bn) but the difference (€67.4bn) is offset almost exactly by its Target2 
claim (€69.9bn); around 98% of the Luxembourg note issue is in high value notes.  
 
 
Table A2: Intra-Eurosystem net claims 
June 2011  € billions 
 Target2 Banknote 
adjustment 
Total 
Austria  -35.1e 28.4 -6.7 
Belgium  -21.3 17.4 -3.9 
Cyprus  -6.4 0.4 -6.0 
Estonia  -0.2 1.7 1.5 
Finland  6.0 3.1 9.1 
France  -18.3 74.4 56.1 
Germany  336.5 -163.1 173.5 
Greece  -96.8 -14.8 -111.6 
Ireland  -129.5 -14.9 -144.4 
Italy  6.0 -1.7 4.3 
Luxembourg  69.9 -67.4 2.5 
Malta  -1.9 -0.1 -2.0 
Netherlands  20.5 24.9 45.5 
Portugal  -57.3 19.8 -37.5 
Slovakia  -13.4 1.4 -12.1 
Slovenia  -2.0 2.3 0.4 
Spain  -45.4 20.4 -25.0 
ECB  -11.6r 67.8 56.2 
Note: Negative numbers indicate amounts owed to other central banks; a 
NCB with a negative banknote adjustment has issued a greater value of 
banknotes than its allocation; e = estimate; r = residual 
Source: NCB financial statements,  IMF International Financial 
Statistics, John Whittaker (2011, Table 2) Eurosystem Debts, 
Greece, and the Role of Banknotes, Lancaster University 
Management School, 14 November  
 
 
Amongst the peripheral Eurozone countries, note issues in Ireland and Greece are also higher 
than their allocations. This adds to their Target2 debts and may reflect hoarding or cash 
transfers out of these countries via the banknote route. As an opposite example, the banknote 
issue in Portugal is approximately zero. The central bank attributes this to tourism, with 
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visitors drawing notes in other Eurozone countries and spending them in Portugal (Annual 
Report, 2010, page 280). 
 
Although these debts are accounted for as lending by the ECB, the ECB itself is owned by the 
NCBs of Eurozone states. Hence, irrespective of which NCBs are actually holding the 
corresponding claims, exposure to these debts falls on the remaining 12 (non-peripheral) 
countries, in proportion to their shares in the capital of the ECB. It may be noted that, while 
Germany insists that its guarantee to the European Financial Stability Facility or its successor 
the European Stability Mechanism for supporting the peripheral countries cannot exceed 
€211bn, its exposure to the same countries via the Eurosystem (€196.6bn in September 2011 
and unlimited) is in addition to this figure. 
Appendix B - Capital subscription to the European Central Bank, 1 January 2015211 
Table B1 shows the Eurozone NCBs’ contributions to the ECB’s capital, while Table B2 
does the same for the non-Eurozone NCBs. 
 
 
Table B1: Eurozone NCBs’ contributions to the ECB’s capital 
 
National central bank Capital key % Share of  
Eurozone NCB 
capital 
Paid-up capital 
(€) 
Nationale Bank van België/Banque 
Nationale de Belgique (Belgium) 
2.4778 3.520027 268,222,025.17 
Deutsche Bundesbank (Germany) 17.9973 25.56743 1,948,208,997.34 
Eesti Pank (Estonia) 0.1928 0.273897 20,870,613.63 
Central Bank of Ireland (Ireland) 1.1607 1.648921 125,645,857.06 
Bank of Greece (Greece) 2.0332 2.888417 220,094,043.74 
Banco de España (Spain) 8.8409 12.55961 957,028,050.02 
Banque de France (France) 14.1792 20.14334 1,534,899,402.41 
Banca d'Italia (Italy) 12.3108 17.48904 1,332,644,970.33 
Central Bank of Cyprus (Cyprus) 0.1513 0.214941 16,378,235.70 
Latvijas Banka (Latvia) 0.2821 0.400759 30,537,344.94 
Lietuvos bankas (Lithuania) 0.4132 0.587003 44,728,929.21 
Banque centrale du Luxembourg 
(Luxembourg) 
0.203 0.288387 21,974,764.35 
Central Bank of Malta (Malta) 0.0648 0.092057 7,014,604.58 
De Nederlandsche Bank (The 
Netherlands) 
4.0035 5.687476 433,379,158.03 
Oesterreichische Nationalbank 
(Austria) 
1.9631 2.788831 212,505,713.78 
Banco de Portugal (Portugal) 1.7434 2.476719 188,723,173.25 
Banka Slovenije (Slovenia) 0.3455 0.490826 37,400,399.43 
Národná banka Slovenska (Slovakia) 0.7725 1.097434 83,623,179.61 
Suomen Pankki – Finlands Bank 
(Finland) 
1.2564 1.784875 136,005,388.82 
Total1 70.3915 100.00 7,619,884,851.40 
Note: 1. Owing to rounding, the total may not correspond to the sum of all figures shown. 
 
                                                 
211 https://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/orga/capital/html/index.en.html 
63 
 
 
 
Table B2: Non-Eurozone NCBs’ contributions to the ECB’s capital 
 
National central bank Capital key % Paid-up capital (€) 
Българска народна банка 
(Bulgarian National Bank) (Bulgaria) 
0.8590 3,487,005.40 
Česká národní banka (Czech 
Republic) 
1.6075 6,525,449.57 
Danmarks Nationalbank (Denmark) 1.4873 6,037,512.38 
Hrvatska narodna banka (Croatia) 0.6023 2,444,963.16 
Magyar Nemzeti Bank (Hungary) 1.3798 5,601,129.28 
Narodowy Bank Polski (Poland) 5.1230 20,796,191.71 
Banca Naţională a României 
(Romania) 
2.6024 10,564,124.40 
Sveriges Riksbank (Sweden) 2.2729 9,226,559.46 
Bank of England (United Kingdom)1 13.6743 55,509,147.81 
Total2 29.6085 120,192,083.17 
Notes: 1. Although the UK’s capital key is quoted as 13.6743%, its actual capital key as a non-Eurozone state 
(used to calculate the BoE’s contribution to ECB capital) is 3.75% of this (since 29 December 2010); 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/orga/capital/html/index.en.html.  
2. Owing to rounding, the total may not correspond to the sum of all figures shown. 
 
Appendix C – List of acronyms 
BIS – Bank for International Settlements  
BoG – Bank of Greece 
BRRD – Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive  
CAGR – compound annual growth rate 
CCP – central counterparty (i.e., clearing house) 
CF – Cohesion Fund 
CRD IV – Capital Requirements Directive IV  
CRR – Capital Requirements Regulation  
EAFRD – European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development  
EBA – European Banking Authority 
EBU – European Banking Union 
ECB – European Central Bank 
EFSF – European Financial Stability Facility 
EFSM – European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism 
EIOPA – European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority 
ELA – Emergency Liquidity Assistance 
EMFF – European Maritime and Fisheries Fund 
EMU – Economic and Monetary Union 
ERDF –European Regional Development Fund 
ERM – Exchange Rate Mechanism 
ESA – European Supervisory Authority 
ECAF – Eurosystem Credit Assessment Framework 
ESF – European Social Fund 
ESFS – European System of Financial Supervision 
ESM – European Stability Mechanism 
ESMA – European Securities and Markets Authority 
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ESRB – European Systemic Risk Board 
EU – European Union 
GDP – gross domestic product 
GFC – Global Financial Crisis 
GNI – gross national income 
IMF – International Monetary Fund  
LCH – London Clearing House 
MiFID II – Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II  
MPS – Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena  
NCB – national central bank 
OCA – Optimal Currency Area 
OECD – Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
OMT – Outright Monetary Transactions 
PSPP – Public Sector Purchase Programme 
QE – quantitative easing 
SGP – Stability and Growth Pact 
SMP – Securities Markets Programme 
SRB – Single Resolution Board 
SRF – Single Resolution Fund 
SRM – Single Resolution Mechanism 
SSM – Single Supervisory Mechanism 
Target2 – Trans-European Automated Real-time Gross Settlement Express Transfer System 
TLAC – Total Loss Absorbing Capacity 
Ucits – Undertakings for Collective Instrument in Transferable Securities 
WTO – World Trade Organisation 
 
 
 
